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Securing Truth for Power:
Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policy Making
Abstract
Whether regulating mutual funds or chemical manufacturers, government’s policy 
decisions depend on information possessed by industry.  But it is not in any industry’s 
interests to share information that will lead to costly regulations.  So how do government 
regulators secure needed information from industry?  Since information disclosed by any 
firm cannot be retrieved and can be used to regulate the entire sector, industry faces a 
collective action problem in maintaining silence.  While collective silence is easy to 
maintain if all firms’ interests are aligned, their payoffs for disclosure can vary due to 
heterogeneous effects of regulation and heterogeneous beliefs about the regulator’s 
expected actions with or without any given information.  The regulator’s strategy is 
therefore to resist or break down industry’s collective silence, either by (1) exploiting 
asymmetries in firms’ interests in disclosure, or (2) selectively rewarding or punishing 
individual firms to create incentives for disclosure.  Both of these strategies work best 
when pursued informally, in less visible ways, since other firms can be expected to inflict 
retribution on any squealer.  Although informal relationships have been long deplored 
due to the risk of regulatory bias or capture, our analysis shows how they can be 
beneficial to government in playing the information game.  This has important 
implications for regulatory procedure.  Since total transparency would detract from 
government’s ability to secure valuable information, administrative law needs to balance 
between the competing needs of transparency to prevent abuse and opacity to facilitate 
information exchange. 
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Securing Truth for Power:
Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policy Making
“The … power that is involved here is the power to get information from those who best 
can give it and who are most interested in not doing so.”
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950)
Information is the lifeblood of regulatory policy.  The effective deployment of 
governmental power depends on information about conditions in the world, strategies for 
improving those conditions, and the consequences associated with deploying different 
strategies.1  Indeed, this need for information has led legislatures to create specialized 
committee structures, delegate policy authority to expert agencies, and develop 
administrative procedures that promote transparency and encourage analysis.2  Yet, legal 
scholars have paid little attention to how regulators gain the information they need for 
1
 As Justice Breyer has written, “[t]he central problem of the standard-setting process and the most pressing 
task facing many agencies is gathering the information needed to write a sensible standard.” STEPHEN 
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).  See generally AARON WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO 
POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY ANALYSIS (1987).
2 KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 4-6 (1991); Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., 
Pablo T. Spiller, &  Santiago Urbiztondo, An Informational Perspective on Administrative Procedures, 15 
J. L. ECON. & ORG. 283 (1999).
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making and implementing regulatory policy.3  While many information-gathering efforts 
by regulatory agencies look more or less like conventional scientific analysis (as when an 
environmental agency studies how pollutants travel through groundwater or a public 
health agency conducts epidemiological research), much needed information will not 
emerge from policy-relevant scientific research.4  In particular, regulators need 
information about the operations of private business enterprises.  Such information 
enables regulators to understand the scope and cause of regulatory problems, and to craft 
effective solutions to them.5
Government regulators are usually poorly positioned to gather information about 
business operations, or at least to gather it cheaply.  Often, the best source of information 
about the risks of products, the behavior of individuals and firms, the costs of remediation 
or mitigation, or the feasibility of different technologies will be the very firms that the 
3
 Legal scholars have, of course, recognized that government officials need information.  See, e.g., Breyer, 
supra note 1; JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 5th 
ed (2003). (observing that “[s]ound decision making obviously requires good information”); Edward 
Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95 (2003) 
(acknowledging that “effective regulation demands large quantities of information”).  However, they have 
yet to analyze the strategic considerations regulators face in obtaining that information through different 
means.
4
 For discussion of the role of science, science policy research, and science advisors in government decision 
making, see SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICYMAKERS (1990).
5 See infra Part I.A.
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government agency regulates.6  While these firms have an incentive to share favorable, 
self-serving information, regulators also need accurate information that private firms do 
not want to disclose.  How does a regulator learn about and acquire information from 
parties who may suffer if they provide it?
In this article, we analyze regulators’ gathering of information from firms as a 
strategic game.  In Part I, we discuss the types of information that firms possess and 
regulators need.  We then analyze the payoffs for regulated firms in keeping this 
information to themselves, arguing that silence by firms within an industry resembles the 
well-known problem of collective action.7  In Parts II and III, we discuss the strategies 
and tactics available to regulators to penetrate a regulated industry's silence and gather 
information needed to develop effective regulation.  Although regulators cannot typically 
offer explicit side payments to firms to induce them to release information, they can 
deploy a variety of mechanisms to try to gather information from those whom the agency 
will target for regulation.  Indeed, selective forms of what might be considered 
“regulatory capture” by individual firms may well be desirable from the standpoint of the 
6
  Cary Coglianese, Litigating within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance in the Regulatory Process, 
30 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 735, 749-750 (1996) (“[A]gency staff members depend heavily on outside groups for 
information.  Effective regulation of an industry depends…on knowledge of how that industry works.  
Agency staff members routinely turn to organizations in the regulated community to provide this 
information.”). 
7
  Edward Parson, Richard Zeckhauser, & Cary Coglianese, Collective Silence and Individual Voice: The 
Logic of Information Games, in JAC HECKELMAN & DENNIS COATES, EDS., COLLECTIVE CHOICE: ESSAYS 
IN HONOR OF MANCUR OLSON (2003).
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public interest in some cases, if in the process firms cede information that permits 
regulators to craft more effective and efficient regulatory policies.8
In Part IV, we consider the relative virtues of the strategies and tactics discussed in 
Parts II and III and theorize about conditions under which each will be appropriate.  
Finally, we discuss the tensions between regulators’ need to gather information from 
industry and the kinds of administrative procedures that have arisen over the past several 
decades to provide legislators and others an opportunity to oversee the work of 
government regulators.  Many administrative procedures promote transparency in 
government decision making almost as if it were an unalloyed good.   Yet while 
transparency serves important goals, it also inhibits some beneficial government 
activities.  We argue that regulators’ need to secure information from those they regulate 
provides a reason for preserving some degree of opacity in some contexts in an otherwise 
transparent and accountable regulatory process.  
I. Industry Information and Regulatory Decision Making
The existence of information asymmetries between producers and consumers is 
widely accepted as justifying certain kinds of regulatory interventions in the marketplace, 
including regulation requiring firms to disclose information.9 Asymmetric information 
8 See infra notes 98-115, 167-172 and accompanying text.
9 STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE (1989).  The use of information disclosure as a regulatory strategy has received 
considerable attention.  MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE: THE RISE OF TECHNOPOPULISM
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also lies at the core of the principal-agent theory that has become central to the study of 
bureaucratic decision making.10  Positive analyses of regulatory policy making have 
focused on the strategies that legislators -- and other governmental overseers of 
administrative agencies -- use to overcome their information disadvantages vis-à-vis 
regulatory officials.11  Yet while the general problem of asymmetric information 
(2002); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance 
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEORGETOWN L.J. 257 (2001); Paul R. Kleindorfer & 
Eric W. Orts, Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 155 (1998); Mary L. 
Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 1795 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins 
and Beyond, 147 U. PENN. L. REV. 613 (1999).
10 DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS 
APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999); Eric Posner, Controlling Agencies with 
Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1137 (2001).  The 
regulator (or administrative agency) is typically treated as the agent, while the legislature or executive is 
treated as a principal.  For a discussion of principal-agent theory, see JOHN W. PRATT & RICHARD J. 
ZECKHAUSER, EDS., PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS (1985). 
11
 Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative 
Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VIRG. L. REV. 499 (1989); Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, & Barry 
Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L., ECON., & ORGAN. 243 
(1987); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? 
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983).
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dominates the contemporary study of regulation, the asymmetries between regulators and 
those they regulate has escaped sustained attention.12
12
  The existence of information asymmetries between regulators and firms has certainly been recognized.  
See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow and Richard Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J. 
ON REG. 1, 18 (1986) (noting that “the regulator's information is assumed to be inferior to that of the 
utility's management” and that “the assumption of asymmetric information is quite plausible”); Glenn 
Blackmon and Richard Zeckhauser, Fragile Commitments and the Regulatory Process, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 
73, 104 (1992) (noting “the principal-agent relationship between the regulator and firm” and the firm’s 
“advantage of superior information”); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People or Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain 
Search for Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1127 (1999) (noting that regulators have a difficult time 
assessing the costs of regulatory options “because that information is generally in the hands of the regulated 
community, which has an incentive to overstate those costs”).  However, virtually no attention has been 
given to the strategies regulators can use to overcome their informational disadvantage and the implications 
of this problem for the design of administrative law. In the relevant legal literature, we find only two 
extended analytical treatments of the information asymmetry between regulators and regulated entities.  See
Jason Scott Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 1343 (2002) (providing a game theoretic analysis of information provision 
under different statutory requirements about benefit-cost analysis); Tracy Lewis and Michel Poitevin, 
Disclosure of Information in Regulatory Proceedings, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 50 (1997) (analyzing the 
effect on information provision and decision making of different evidentiary standards in regulatory 
proceedings).  This work, like ours, recognizes the information asymmetries in making regulatory policy.  
However, it differs in important respects.  For example, Johnston focuses on information asymmetries with 
respect to compliance costs only, whereas we recognize asymmetries in information about benefits as well.  
Lewis and Poitevin consider only the context where a regulator must review an application or petition from 
a regulated entity, while we analyze that context as but one of many institutional arrangements for 
gathering information.  More importantly, unlike these studies, we tend to view the strategic problem from 
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In this first Part we consider the nature and degree of regulators’ informational 
dependence on those they regulate.  We begin by explaining the importance of 
information in regulatory decision making, and then explain why industry usually 
disproportionately possesses the information needed to craft good regulatory policy.  
Most importantly, we show why an industry often has a collective interest in keeping to
itself some or all of the information government decision makers need.
A. Regulators’ Need for Information
Government regulators face the challenge of breaking industry silence by securing 
information from those whose immediate interests would oppose its release.  Regulators 
rely on information to tailor policies that will achieve their goals, such as reducing risks.  
They also need information for strategic reasons, such as to anticipate reactions by 
regulated entities and to persuade other political or legal actors that their decisions are 
appropriate.
Government regulation is generally required to correct for three main types of market 
failures:13  lack of competition (as in cases of monopoly);14 externalities (the failure of 
the perspective of the regulator, identifying strategies for government to use to play the informational game 
embedded within regulatory policy making.
13
  Competitive markets prove highly successful for producing and allocating society’s resources.  
However, the conditions for socially optimal market transactions do not always obtain.  For an overview of 
the role and limits of the market, see EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY 
ANALYSIS 291-308 (1978).  For recent discussion of market failures, see Office of Management and 
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market prices to incorporate all the costs to society of a particular form of economic 
behavior);15 and a lack of full information about products and services (for prices 
therefore cannot reflect the true preferences of the parties).16  For each of these three 
Budget, Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations Under Executive Order 12866 (Jan. 11, 1996), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/riaguide.html (directing analysts to identify a 
“significant market failure” justifying each proposed regulation); Office of Management and Budget, 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, A Report to the President on the Third Anniversary of 
Executive Order 12866 (Dec. 1996), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/riaguide.html; 
Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Guidelines to 
Standardize Measures of Costs and Benefits and the Format of Accounting Statements (2000), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ memoranda/m00-08.pdf. But see Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., & Howard E. 
McCurdy, The Failure of Market Failure, 18 J. POL. ANAL. & MGT. 558 (1999) (arguing that a superficial 
focus on market failure can lead analysts to overlook the underlying causes of regulatory problems and that 
attention to transaction costs offers a better approach).
14
 Concentration of market power, whether through predatory behavior or a so-called “natural monopoly,” 
enables firms to obtain rents by reducing supply below the levels that would arise in a fully competitive 
marketplace.  DAVID L. WEIMER & AIDAN R. VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 
1998).  Market power provides the justification for antitrust law and certain kinds of utility regulation.
15 Id.  Although manufacturing firms’ count their private costs, such as capital, labor, and other inputs, they 
will not count the costs that pollution from their factories impose on neighboring communities. 
Environmental regulation responds to this type of market failure, seeking to alter firms’ behavior in ways 
that reduce negative externalities.
16 Id.  Usually sellers will know more about the efficacy and safety of their products than will buyers.  In 
such cases, government regulation may be needed to overcome the information asymmetries between 
consumers and sellers.  Labeling and product testing requirements fall into this category.  See also supra
note 9.
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types of market failure, regulators need to gather information about the activities of, and 
costs and benefits for, individuals and firms.  They must first be able to determine when 
market conditions fail to meet the ideal of a well-functioning market.  Then they must 
identify possible solutions and assess the consequences of different potential responses 
they might take.17
To identify whether firms are acting as monopolists, regulators need information 
about firms’ marginal costs of production. For utility regulation, they often need to know 
whether firms are making the kind of cost-effective choices about technology or 
management that they would make if the market were fully competitive.18  For social 
regulation that addresses externalities or seeks to ensure adequate product disclosure or 
safety, regulators need to know about the risks created by different types of products and 
production processes.  Thus, they need to know about the nature and magnitude of any 
harmful activity or products, as well as the probability of such harm.  Regulators also 
17
   We recognize, of course, that the regulators’ information needs will not be the same for all alternative 
solutions.  For example, regulators do not need the same information to restrict the quantity of an 
externality (such as pollution) as they do to require the adoption of specific control technologies for, or 
impose a tax on, that same externality.  See, e.g., Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 477 (1974); Evan Kwerel, To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution 
Control, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 595 (1977); Amyaz A. Moledina et al., Dynamic Environmental Policy with 
Strategic Firms: Prices versus Quantities, 45 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGT. 356 (2003).  Although the choice of 
regulatory instrument will therefore affect the type and amount of information a regulator will need in any 
given context, the regulator will still always need some information about regulatory problems and their 
alternative solutions.     
18 See Joskow and Schmalensee, supra note 12, at 16-17.
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need to understand the causes of regulatory problems.  When the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration learns of a cluster of automobile accidents, it needs to find 
out whether the accidents occurred due to driver errors, road conditions, or mechanical 
problems.  When the agency responded to blowouts in Firestone tires, for instance, 
NHTSA regulators needed to understand the extent to which tire separation was caused 
by factors such as heat or underinflation of tires, the tires’ poor design or production, or 
the design or operation of the vehicles on which the tires were installed.19
Regulations usually specify actions that individuals or firms either must or must not 
take, so regulators must know what the possible behaviors they might require or prohibit.  
Particularly for problems of externalities or product hazards, regulators need to be able to 
specify technological or managerial options to change present operations and reduce risk.  
For example, environmental regulators need to know how oil refining, computer 
manufacturing, and other industrial operations can generate less pollution.   Auto safety 
regulators need to understand what steps can be taken to prevent blowouts.  Even when 
regulations set performance standards, regulators must often know about solutions in 
order to choose a feasible standard.20
19
  NHTSA, Engineering Analysis Report and Initial Decision Regarding EA00-023: Firestone Wilderness 
AT Tires, Oct. 4, 2001, available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/hot/Firestone/firestonesummary.html 
(presenting competing analyses of the root causes of tire separation in Firestone tires); NHTSA, Proposed 
Rule on Tire Standards, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,050, 10,054-56 (Mar. 5, 2002) (analyzing factors leading to tire 
failure).  After further study, NHTSA eventually did issue new standards for vehicle tires.  NHTSA, Final 
Rule on Tire Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 38,116 (June 26, 2003).
20
  This is especially the case for performance standards that are explicitly based on what is achievable by 
existing technologies.
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Finally, regulators need information about the probable (and actual, if known) 
consequences of different courses of action.21  These consequences include the extent to 
which a proposed regulation will deliver social benefits, such as enhanced safety or 
public health.  They also include other effects, such as compliance costs, impacts on 
technological innovation, and the creation of additional harms or side effects.22  For 
example, if regulators at NHTSA seek to reduce fatalities from automobile accidents and 
are considering a requirement that manufacturers install air bags, they need to know more 
than just how well different types of air bags will reduce overall levels of injuries or 
fatalities.  Price increases associated with an air bag mandate could reduce sales of new 
21 See, e.g., Richard Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, MARY. L. REV. (1986) (“Formulating centralized 
directives to control complex industrial and governmental subsystems involves exorbitant information and 
decision making costs.  Enormous amounts of data must be centrally accumulated and analyzed in order to 
determine desired results and formulate the specific commands needed to achieve them.”).  The practice of 
benefit-cost analysis in regulatory policy making presumes that information about consequences is relevant, 
even if not necessarily dispositive, in making regulatory policy.  See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, et al., Is There 
a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221 
(April 12, 1996) (defending benefit-cost analysis as “an economic tool for comparing the desirable and 
undesirable impacts of proposed policies”).
22
 Regulators also need information about expected compliance with different regulations, since full 
compliance is rarely achieved.  Cf. Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset 
Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1998) (noting the tendency of budget 
officials to “meet with affected parties to obtain information so that their projections will more accurately 
predict taxpayer behavior”).  For a regulator, information about noncompliance with existing rules may 
even constitute a reason to issue new rules.
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and safer cars, or the air bags themselves might create new risks of harm, such as by 
deploying at high speeds into the faces of children or smaller-than-average adults.23
Regulators depend on information for nearly everything they do.24  The pages of the 
Federal Register are filled with information about regulatory problems, alternative 
solutions, and their consequences.  Agency dockets and the offices of agencies’ staff 
members contain still more information collected in connection with rulemaking.  As 
Justice Breyer has observed, regulators’ demand for information is “central and endemic” 
to the making of regulatory policy.25
B. Industry’s Informational Advantage
When governmental intervention is needed to protect the public from harms arising 
largely independent of economic activity – such as perhaps the transmission of disease or 
natural climate variability – the relevant information may be acquired by government or 
independent researchers as easily as by regulatory agencies.  Agencies may develop their 
own in-house expertise, and may also draw upon the expertise of academic researchers, 
23 See, e.g., Sam Kazman, NHTSA Air Bag Mandate Misfires, REG’N. 17 (Winter 1997)
24
  This holds true even if regulators are concerned mainly about protecting their own turf or maintaining 
their budgets.  After all, even parochial regulators need information about their policies in order to predict 
and respond to reactions by interest groups and governmental overseers.
25 STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 112 (1982).
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independent consultants, or even the staff of advocacy groups.26  Such expertise tends to 
be general, say on the effects of air pollutants on health.  
This kind of general expertise, however, is not sufficient when agencies must make 
decisions about particular industry practices.  Internal agency experts, and even their 
outside consultants, will be at a disadvantage.  Firms simply have much better access to 
the up-to-date and fine-grained information needed.27
Where government contemplates regulation to protect public health or safety, those 
engaging in the potentially harmful activity are likely to hold the relevant information or 
be able to obtain it more readily than the government.  Manufacturing firms, for instance, 
almost always know much more than government about the risks associated with their 
products, technologies, and processes.28  They learn through their own testing, from 
reports of complaints by customers or workers, or just based on their superior 
understanding of the properties of their products and processes.  For example, computer 
manufacturer IBM developed highly detailed in-house databases to track the chemicals 
used in IBM’s production processes, the exposure of employees to these chemicals, and 
26 BREYER, supra note 1, at 109.
27
 David E.M. Sappington & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and Regulation, in ELIZABETH E. BAILEY, ED., 
PUBLIC REGULATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES 3, 6 (1987) (noting that even if 
regulators do acquire information about firms’ production technologies, demand structures, and factor costs 
they do so “only with a lag, and indeed, in a rapidly changing environment, the information that they 
acquire may be of only limited relevance to the current situation”).
28
 Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Implementation of Federal Regulations, 13 YALE J. ON REG.  535 
(1996) (noting that firms are “more knowledgeable about the risks generated by their company’s 
operations”). 
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employees’ medical histories.29   Through such internal tracking systems, firms can 
identify risks from their products and manufacturing processes long before government is 
able to learn of them.30  It is generally accepted that tobacco companies knew about the 
health risks from cigarettes decades before this information was known in governmental 
and public health circles.31  Chemical firms reportedly knew about health threats from 
vinyl chloride emissions long before government knew or could have known about 
them.32
Firms’ informational advantage over government is usually even more pronounced 
for information about alternative solutions, such as how to reduce the emissions of vinyl 
29
  Gerald Hillman, ECHOES: IBM’s Environmental, Chemical and Occupational Evaluation System, 24 J. 
OCCUPATIONAL MED. 827 (1982); Spencer E. Ante, Was IBM Hazardous to Workers’ Health?, BUSINESS 
WEEK, October 20, 2003, p. 46, 48.
30
  Other major companies have implemented systems to track their impacts on occupational health and 
environmental quality.  See R.E. Joyner & Phil H. Pack, The Shell Oil Company’s Computerized Health 
Surveillance System, 24 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 812 (1982); Maureen T. O’Berg et al., Cancer Incidence 
and Mortality in the DuPont Company: An Update, 29 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 245 (1987); Cary 
Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Bolstering Private-Sector Environmental Management, 17 ISSUES SCI. & 
TECH. 69 (Spring 2001). 
31 DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A DEADLY INDUSTRY 182 
(2001); MARTHA DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE: FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION IN TOBACCO POLITICS
(2001).
32 Chemical Reaction, THE ECON. (March 31, 2001), available at 
http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=550695.
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chloride.33  While firms may not have the incentive to acquire information about 
alternative solutions -- ignorance is a virtue if knowledge will lead to pressures to 
undertake costly changes to existing practices -- these private actors will have much more 
experience about how their activities might be modified to reduce or solve a problem.  
For example, automobile manufacturers will know better than government the options 
available for building safer cars or boosting mileage.
Most significantly, firms are better equipped to predict and identify the consequences 
of different regulatory options.  Obviously, firms can better project their costs of 
producing goods or services under different regulatory standards.  They can also better 
identify other consequences.  For example, they will know how long it will take to 
incorporate new designs into their products and their manufacturing schedules, relevant 
information in deciding the length of any phase-in period for new regulations.  Firms also 
generally have superior information about potential tradeoffs created by alternative rules.  
For example, regulators will want to consider whether changes in the fuel economy 
standards for cars will affect crash safety, something manufacturers can more easily 
assess.34
33
  Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to 
Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOCY. REV. 691, 695 (2003) (noting that firms “possess the most 
information about risks and potential control methods”).
34
  For a discussion of the potential tradeoff between fuel economy and automobile safety, see NATIONAL 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY (CAFE) 
STANDARDS 113 (2002).
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It is often impossible for government agencies to conduct independent research to 
reproduce the information held by private actors.  Even where possible, it is almost 
always more expensive, since firms have significant advantages in cumulative 
experience, technical skills, access to data, and research capacity, not to mention the fact 
that they own the production process.  If firms already have the needed information, 
efforts by government to replicate it would be duplicative and wasteful.35
35
  We recognize, of course, that not all information provided by firms will be accurate, reliable, or helpful, 
and that relying exclusively and unthinkingly on the information provided by a single firm or industry can 
contribute to biased regulatory decision making.  See PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL 
REGULATORY AGENCIES 17 (1981); Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An 
Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821 (2003) (suggesting that because “agencies rely so heavily 
on information about the consequences of regulatory alternatives from the very interests most affected by 
regulation, who therefore know the most about those consequences, agencies over time become unwittingly 
biased in favor of those they regulate”).  Our claim is not that all or even most information supplied by 
industry will be the most valuable information to regulators, but rather that the best and most valuable 
information in many instances of regulatory policy making will be available only from industry.  We are 
interested in those cases where industry holds reliable and accurate information that will help a regulator 
make a decision.  In those cases where reliable and accurate information held by industry also supports the 
interests of that industry, we can expect that industry will readily release it.  The problem we are addressing 
in this article is how to get valuable information from business when releasing that information does not 
advance industry’s interests. 
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II. The Strategy to Overcome Industry Silence
Making effective regulatory policy depends on information that is often held by 
private actors, but government cannot count on self-interested holders of information to 
reveal it fully and without bias.36  Neither can it count on its power to compel the 
disclosure of information.  Regulatory agencies can only mandate the disclosure of 
information when they are so authorized by Congress,37 and for many issues they lack 
such subpoena authority.38  Even when agencies do have authority, firms may resist or 
evade government demands.  And when firms do release the precise information 
requested, they rarely generate anything more -- a distinct disadvantage when regulators 
are less certain about what they need to know.  Far better, for regulators, is to find a 
cooperative source that will engage in give-and-take with the regulator, answering 
follow-up questions, providing background details that help the regulator fit the requested 
information into a larger pattern and to search for additional information when needed.
How can regulators secure information from those they regulate?  In this Part, we 
begin by looking at this question from the standpoint of an industry.  Since regulations 
affect entire industrial sectors, the release of relevant and accurate information from any 
36
  Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 388 (1986) 
(observing that industry has incentives to keep regulatory agencies’ from receiving information they need
when setting regulatory policy). 
37 See generally infra Part III.B.
38
  For example, the FDA lacked general subpoena power that it could use to gather information in its 
rulemaking involving the tobacco industry.  DAVID KESSLER, supra note 31.
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actor within a given sector will help the regulator, but likely harm others in the sector --
as when one tobacco company or asbestos manufacturer releases information to the 
government about the hazards of its products.  The challenge for an industry, therefore, is 
to maintain a collective silence.
The information game between regulators and industry has a complex set of payoffs 
from information disclosure, and this complexity provides opportunities for government 
regulators to elicit the information they need to make effective regulatory policy.   As we 
explain in this Part, the basic strategy is for the regulator to discover, exploit, and, if 
necessary, create asymmetric interests in the release of relevant information.  The 
regulator must also address the risk of retribution that any disclosing party will likely face 
from others within industry. 
A. Industry Incentives and the Problem of Collective Silence
The provision of information to support effective public decision-making benefits 
society on net.39  Yet potential targets of regulation will often lose, and therefore will 
39
  Karl Claxton, Bayesian Approaches to the Value of Information: Implications for the Regulation of New 
Pharmaceuticals, 8 HEALTH ECON. 269, 271 (1999) (“Information is non rival and a public good.”); 
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 103 
(“[I]nformation is sometimes a public good. Once it is available at all, or to anyone, it may well be 
available to everyone or to many people.”); William Mock, On The Centrality of Information Law: A 
Rational Choice Discussion of Information Law and Transparency, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. 
L. 1069, 1085 (1999) (“The cost structure of information, including the ease of reproducing it and the fact 
that it is not lost to a transferor, makes most forms of information public goods.”).
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yield or withhold information strategically.  Targets’ decisions to produce information, 
and to reveal, bias, or conceal what they hold, will reflect their calculated attempts to 
influence the knowledge and perceptions of regulators so as to promote public decisions 
that either reduce their anticipated costs or increase their private benefits.40
An industry group as a whole will usually have an interest in maintaining silence, in 
retaining or not even generating information that would be adverse to the interests of 
private firms.41  Silence is preferred when regulators might use the information to make a 
decision adverse to the industry.  The more regulators learn about individual firms’ 
40 See ROGER G. NOLL & BRUCE M. OWEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEREGULATION: INTEREST 
GROUPS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS (1983) (“[I]nterest groups have an incentive to withhold 
information that is inconsistent with their position and to present incomplete or biased information that 
supports their views.”); Edward A. Parson, The Technology Assessment Approach to Climate Change, 18 
ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 65 (2002) (“No company or industry has an interest in helping regulators to impose 
burdens on them.”).
41
  Our analysis also applies to the selective or biased release of information in a way favorable to 
industry’s interests.  However, for the sake of our analysis, we generally treat the informational decision 
facing industry to be a binary one: either disclose truthfully and fully, or not at all.  We recognize that such 
a simplification abstracts away much of the subtleties in information transmission, leaving to the side 
selective transmission, signposting, framing, and spinning, and all sorts of important questions about 
interpretation.  Richard Zeckhauser & David V.P. Marks, Signposting: the Selective Revelation of Product 
Information, in RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER, RALPH L. KEENEY, & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, EDS. WISE CHOICES: 
DECISIONS, GAMES, AND NEGOTIATIONS (1996).  We make this simplifying assumption here because our 
main purpose here is to bring clarity to the structure of incentives facing industry and the strategies 
available to government to identify and respond to those incentives.
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technological capabilities, the more able they will be, all things being equal, to design 
and justify more stringent requirements later.
Once someone releases information to the regulator, it usually cannot be retracted,42
and it usually leads to consequences that extend beyond the discloser.  Thus all the firms 
within a relevant sector will have a collective interest in everyone’s maintaining silence.  
When no firm’s benefits from revealing information outweigh its benefits from silence, 
there is no conflict between individual and collective interests; silence will prevail.  But 
when firms’ individual interests to reveal conflict with the industry’s collective interest in 
silence, maintaining silence effectively becomes a problem of collective action.43  The 
collective action problem arises when there exists some good that all members of a group 
can share, but when each group member has an incentive to “free ride,” i.e., let the others 
work to produce the collective good.  For example, all citizens can enjoy the benefits of a 
cleaner environment, but each individual’s share of these benefits is usually far smaller 
than the cost to any single individual to lobby successfully for new environmental 
42
  Otto Keck, The Information Dilemma: Private Information as a Cause of Transaction Failure in 
Markets, Regulation, Hierarchy, and Politics, 31 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 139, 152 (1987) (noting that 
“exchange of information is irreversible”).  Disclosure by one actor may, of course, be disputed or 
contradicted by others.  In some cases, the release of information by one actor may be insufficient to meet 
the regulator’s needs, and still more information is needed from others.  We discuss the implications of the 
order of disclosure infra at Part II.C.
43
  The quintessential collective action problem is getting individuals to make voluntary contributions to a 
common purpose, such as supporting a museum or a professional organization.  For a discussion of the 
problem of collective action, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS 
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982).
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regulations.  Since individuals will be able to enjoy a cleaner environment regardless of 
whether they participated in any collective lobbying effort, each individual will have an 
incentive to free ride on the activities of others.  The collective action that is optimal 
action for the group does not arise spontaneously.
A comparable tension between collective and individual interest exists with 
information.  Each firm in the sector benefits from silence, but only if all firms do not 
disclose information to the regulator.  Thus, industry faces a problem of “collective 
inaction” – to maintain silence.44
The immediate costs of concealing information are usually trivial, since silence 
typically requires taking no action at all; instead, the collective inaction challenge 
becomes severe when the consequences of regulatory decisions based on information 
released differ across firms.45  Some firms might not be harmed.  Some firms may even 
benefit from disclosure (at least relative to their competitors).  For example, if 
competitors differ in the costs of controlling a certain type of risk, it may be beneficial for 
a low-cost firm to disclose information about the risk to the regulator.
44
   Parson, Zeckhauser, & Coglianese, supra note 7.
45
  More precisely, these differences are ones of expected consequences.  The expected value of silence and 
disclosure for any individual firm will reflect its predictions about the consequences of the action a 
regulator will likely take if certain information were to be disclosed.  These predictions will be based on 
judgments about the behavior of the regulator, the degree of confidence the regulator will have in the 
information, and the responses of other group members to the disclosure of that information.
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B. The Information Game
     The real world game among industry participants can best be understood with the aid 
of a game theory matrix.  We illustrate for just two firms, but the lessons readily extend 
to cases with many.  Each of the firms prefers the outcome where both Maintain Silence.  
If the game is fully symmetric, and the regulator intervenes no further, this outcome can 
be expected.
Firm A
Maintain Silence
Reveal Industry 
Information
Maintain 
Silence 10,10 0,8
Firm B
Reveal 
Industry 
Information
8,0 6,6
In this situation, Firm A would reason as follows:  “If Firm B is going to Reveal, I should 
as well.  But if B Maintains Silence, I also want to Maintain Silence.  However, B is 
insightful, and will see that the both Maintain Silence equilibrium is preferable for both 
of us than both Reveal.  Thus, I will Maintain Silence.”  Firm A will reason equivalently, 
and silence will be maintained.
We have presented the information game using illustrative payoff structures but the 
expected payoffs from silence and disclosure of particular pieces of information will 
often vary from firm to firm.  Even if firms always made the same predictions about a 
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regulator’s actions (and they do not), those actions will affect different firms differently.  
Regulation can sometimes benefit certain firms, for example by raising barriers to entry 
by competitors.46  Firms that specialize in developing risk-reduction technologies will 
have interests that differ from firms that might be required to buy these technologies.  
Even among comparable firms in the same sector, there will be differences in the 
capacity and cost of each firm to respond to new regulations.  If overall demand for a 
product is fairly inelastic, an increase in one firm’s costs by, say, $10 per unit may be 
worthwhile for that firm if it simultaneously increases competitors’ costs by $20 per unit.  
Firms that are already leaders in their sectors in health, safety, or environmental 
protection will likely not be so affected by new regulations as so-called laggard firms.47
Firms that discover more benign industrial practices may believe they could reap a 
competitive advantage by revealing what they have learned to the regulator and 
encouraging the promulgation of new rules that will differentially burden their 
competitors.  
In this situation, the game theory matrix will no longer be symmetric.  Let us say that 
firm A is the one that gains by revealing information, particularly if B does not.  The 
matrix might be as follows:
46 See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGT. SCI. 3, 3-6 
(1971).
47 See NEIL GUNNINGHAM & DARREN SINCLAIR, LEADERS AND LAGGARDS: NEXT GENERATION 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (2002).
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Firm A
Maintain Silence Reveal Now
Reveal if Firm B 
Reveals
Maintain 
Silence 10,10 0,14 Not applicable
Reveal Now 8,0 6,6 7,4Firm B
Reveal if 
Firm A 
Reveals
Not applicable 4,12 Not applicable
In this game, Firm A will Reveal Now, since this is its preferred strategy no matter what 
B does.  Firm B, anticipating this, will also Reveal Now, so as to receive 6 rather than 4 
or 0.  Note the danger if firms do not know their counterpart’s type.  It may be that both 
firms have the payoffs of Firm B, but if they are sufficiently worried that the other firm 
may have payoffs like A, or indeed that the other firm may think that it has payoffs like A 
(even though they are like B), then the other firm will Reveal Now.  Thus, the worrying 
firm should also Reveal Now.  Thus, if there is sufficient uncertainty about payoffs, the 
situation may have a stable equilibrium where both Maintain Silence, but one or both 
parties may Reveal Now.  
Regulators can themselves take action to affect firms’ interests in disclosure.  This 
strategy is well known in criminal law, where prosecutors cut deals with low-level 
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employees or bit players in conspiracies if they share information. Thus, regulators try to 
turn Figure 1 situations into a Prisoners’ Dilemmas, where both firms have an incentive 
to Reveal, although both would be better off if they both Maintained Silence.  The 
regulator will also work to create less extreme situations, like the one illustrated in Figure 
2.  Identifying and working on the firms that have the greatest incentive to break silence, 
or agreeing to reward the first firm that breaks silence are strategies that help in this 
creation.  It may also just be helpful to wander among firms searching for information, 
with vague hints that cooperators will get some reward.  Each firm will worry that some 
other firm has an incentive to bolt the Maintain Silence equilibrium.  When its worry gets 
large, that gives a firm an incentive to bolt first.
     In Part III, we discuss the various ways that regulators can reward or punish 
individual firms based on whether they disclose information.48  Asymmetrical interests 
may also arise out of different beliefs about the likelihood that silence will successfully 
stave off new regulation.  If it appears that a regulator intends to issue a regulation even 
in the absence of certain information, some firms may prefer to be perceived as “good 
citizens” and to release information in an attempt to shape the details of the new 
regulation.
Finally, firms are made up of individual people whose interests may vary.  The 
individual employees or managers who make up a firm are the people who actually 
collect, analyze, and store information that may be of value to a regulator.  Their interests 
48 See infra Part III.
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will not, of course, always be fully aligned with the firm’s overall interests;49 personal 
payoffs may differ from the payoffs to their firm.  Individuals may not care about the 
benefits that silence brings to the firm as an organization, and they may sometimes find 
that cooperating with a regulator brings them personal benefits, such as by making it 
easier in the future for them to interact with the regulator on other matters related to their 
jobs.  
In sum, payoffs to firms or individuals can depart from the industry’s collective 
payoff from preserving silence in three ways.  First, payoffs may differ among firms.  Not 
all firms will oppose the revelation of specific information to the same extent, and some 
might even gain a comparative advantage from the resulting regulation.  Second, 
regulators may seek to manipulate firms’ payoffs for disclosure.  Third, employees’ 
interests may diverge from those of their firms.
As a result, an industry as a whole faces a challenge in maintaining collective silence.  
An industry needs to be able to threaten retribution on those who squeal. Retribution can 
range from various social sanctions inflicted against the managers of a squealing firm 
(e.g., yelling at them on the phone or withdrawing invitations to social events), to kicking 
the firm out of the industry trade association, to leaking information uniquely damaging 
to the squealing firm.  (Why would firms disclose information adverse to a competitor 
only as retribution, instead of disclosing it preemptively?  The reason is simple.  If a firm 
did not hold back, it would then be the squealing firm and would itself be subject to 
retribution.)  The risk of retribution is clearest for employees who disclose information 
49 JOHN W. PRATT & RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER, EDS., PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF 
BUSINESS 4 (1985).
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adverse to their employers:  they lose their current job, and can expect difficulty finding 
employment elsewhere in the industry.50  Thus, the threat of retribution helps reinforce 
silence within an industry.  Of course, when firms or individuals can disclose information 
to a regulator without it being known to others that they are disclosing, they can reduce 
the risk of retribution.  For this reason, as we will see, there exists a heretofore 
unappreciated value to secrecy in the regulatory process.   
C. Informational Strategy for Regulators
Regulators face two distinct scenarios in the disclosure of information.  In the first, 
the interests within an industry are asymmetric, and the industry faces a challenge in 
maintaining collective silence.  That is, some firms (or individuals) would expect to 
benefit from exposing certain information to the regulator; others would expect to lose.  
The regulator will seek to exploit these asymmetries and try to secure information from 
those who would expect to gain.  In the second scenario, all firms’ natural incentives are 
to maintain collective silence.  The regulator will need to create new incentives, by 
offering rewards or punishments (or both) for the release of relevant and accurate 
information.  In this section, we explain the payoffs underlying these two scenarios and 
develop general strategic considerations government regulators face in overcoming 
expected industry silence.
1. Exploit Asymmetries of Interests.  Asymmetries of interest arise across different 
firms when firms face (or perceive that they face) different levels of harm from the 
50 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 6 (2003).
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disclosure of certain information.  For example, in the 1970s, aerosol product firms tried 
to maintain a unified opposition to a ban on chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) propellants.  As 
consumer resistance to aerosol products emerged, however, the S.C. Johnson Wax 
Company broke ranks and announced that it would remove all CFC propellants from its 
products.  S.C. Johnson could take this position because it had developed water-based 
propellants twenty years earlier and used CFCs in only a small fraction of its aerosol 
products.51  The subsequent ban on CFC propellants was much less adverse to Johnson’s 
interests as it was to other companies’ interests, and could actually offer it some 
competitive advantage, at least in the short term.     
To exploit asymmetries, regulators try to find the firms that are equivalent to the 
Johnson Wax Company.  Since firms differ in the extent to which their business depends 
on a technology or practice of concern to regulators, perhaps because they have a 
substitute, regulators can try to elicit information from the firms likely to be affected least 
by a new regulation, but that still possess information that can be generalized across the 
industry.  Firms that have already invested in strategies with lesser social impacts may 
actually prefer to disclose information that will promote regulation, or at least may be 
less opposed to its release.  For example, prior to issuing a recent notice of proposed 
rulemaking on dietary supplements, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) engaged in 
various public outreach and information-gathering efforts.  The larger manufacturers 
shared information because they hoped that FDA’s rulemaking “would establish a level 
playing field for industry, which would help prevent irresponsible firms from making and 
51 L. DOTTO AND H. SCHIFF, THE OZONE WAR (1978).
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selling adulterated products.”52  Firms at the forefront of their fields may even cultivate 
relationships with regulators, so that they can pass along information about innovative 
practices that regulators might make obligatory.
There are many differences beyond those between so-called “leaders and laggards.”53
Older firms may have interests that differ from newer firms.  Suppliers’ interests can 
differ from those of manufacturers.  Firms selling to regional or niche markets may differ 
from firms selling to a broad, national market.  Differences in firms’ cost structures, 
technologies, and comparative abilities will affect attitudes toward disclosing information 
to regulators.
Firms also differ in the degree to which they are regulated.  Some firms are affected 
by an entire series of regulations issued by a government agency, while other firms are 
affected by only a few of the agency’s rules.  Firms that interact with a regulatory agency 
on an ongoing basis will have a stronger interest in open and accurate disclosure of 
otherwise adverse information on a particular issue than firms that rarely interact with the 
agency; the former have more need to maintain their credibility with the regulator.  
Regulators can also exploit asymmetries inside firms, by seeking information from 
employees, the so-called whistleblowers.  Sometimes regulators receive employee 
52
  FDA, Proposed Rule on Dietary Supplements, 68 Fed. Reg. 12,158 (Mar. 13, 2003).
53 See, e.g., Marissa Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Who Gets 
Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 262 (1998) (observing based on a study of HUD 
regulations that “businesses did not present a united front”); David M. Hart, Business Is Not an Interest 
Group (And, By the Way, There’s No Such Thing as “Business”): On the Study of Companies in American 
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information passively.  For example, New York’s attorney general, Eliot Spitzer, 
received a tip from a whistleblower in 2003 that suggested illegal market-timing and 
after-hours trading within the mutual fund industry.  This prompted further investigation 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission and led to new regulations of the industry.54
Regulators often do not wait for employee revealers to step forward.  For example, in 
the Food and Drug Administration’s tobacco rulemaking in the 1990s, Commissioner 
David Kessler admitted that he “badly needed industry informants who could help [him] 
piece together the bits of information … and make sense of it all.”55  He directed his staff 
to track down current and former employees who might possess information to help the 
FDA build its case against tobacco.  One informant the agency located “confirmed that 
the technology existed to make tobacco that was free of nicotine,” a fact that the tobacco 
industry had undoubtedly tried to suppress.56
When exploiting potential asymmetries across or within firms, regulators must protect 
their sources from retribution.  To this end, they treat sources confidentially.  For 
National Politics, Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper No. RWP02-032 (2002) (arguing that 
on many policy issues there are no common positions for all businesses).
54
   Adrian Michaels, SEC Widens Investigation into Mutual Funds, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 5, 2003, at p. 
33 (reporting on SEC probe of the mutual fund industry launched after Attorney General Spitzer’s office 
received tip about market timing); Meet a Major-League Whistle-Blower, 60 Minutes II (February 19, 
2004), at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/02/17/60II/main600649.shtml (accessed Mar. 20, 2004) 
(describing Wall Street insider Noreen Harrington’s decision to go to Attorney General Spitzer’s office 
with information about marking timing). 
55 KESSLER, supra note 31, at 112.
56 Id. at 115
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example, after providing assurances of confidentiality, FDA investigators did little more 
than appeal to civic duty to convince most tobacco informants to reveal information 
adverse to the their current or former employers.57  Regulatory agencies commonly 
provide protections for confidential business information, which allows firms to provide 
information without competitors’ knowing what they revealed.58  Of course, it is also 
important that the regulator avoid using the information in a way that would hint at its 
underlying source.  Double sourcing – revealing only when other confirmatory 
information has been obtained through other means – offers such protection.59
57 KESSLER, supra note 31, at 81, 83, 235.
58
  The Freedom of Information Act exempts agencies from disclosing “trade secrets and commercial or 
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.” 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(4).  In 
addition, the Trade Secrets Act provides additional protection for certain confidential business information.  
18 U.S.C. §1905.  While such protection can be valuable even when government mandates disclosure, such 
protection of confidentiality will be even more critical when government is seeking information voluntarily 
by exploiting asymmetries of interests, given the potential competitive or retributive consequences if the 
revealer is found out.  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized the need to protect the 
confidentiality of business information precisely to encourage continued cooperation by industry in 
informing government decision makers.  Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  In an en banc decision, the court interpreted section 552(b)(4) of the 
Freedom of Information Act to exempt disclosure of virtually any business information voluntarily 
submitted to the government.  Id.
59
  In some cases, regulators will be able to, or will need to, use information leaked to it as a basis for 
issuing orders for further information.  For example, the tips state officials received about practices in 
mutual fund firms helped the SEC know what information to order funds to disclose, something which it 
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Regulators may also offer to protect whistleblowers against reprisals from their 
employers.   For example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued regulations 
that prohibit nuclear facilities from firing, reducing the salary, or otherwise 
discriminating against employees who report violations to the NRC.60 It has also issued 
rules that prohibit employers from including “no-talk” provisions in agreements settling 
employment discrimination disputes, finding that such restrictions can “have a chilling 
effect on communications about nuclear safety, security, or other matters, and would 
restrict, impede, or frustrate full and candid disclosure to the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission about matters of regulatory significance.”61
2. Create Incentives.  When regulators cannot identify sources that might reveal, or 
suspect there are none, they are in the second scenario.  The regulators must create new 
incentives to break industry’s silence, i.e., to get firms to disclose information.62
has now done for many financial institutions in the mutual fund business.  We discuss the relationship 
between the different strategies further in Part II.A.3.
60
  Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Whistleblower Protection for Employees of NRC-Licensed Activities, 
58 Fed. Reg. 52406 (October 8, 1993).  
61
 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Preserving the Free Flow of Information to the Commission, 55 Fed. 
Reg. 10,397 (March 21, 1990).
62
  There is a symmetry here with the conventional problem of collective action.  One of the well-known 
solutions to this problem is the provision of selective benefits.  Political interest groups organized to 
promote collective interests routinely offer gifts, discounts, magazines, or travel benefits to solicit new 
members.  They also serve as nodes for valuable networking for business or social purposes.  OLSON, supra
note 43; Robert Salisbury, An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 1 (1969); 
JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATION (1973).
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Regulators can issue information requests under a threat of some penalty.  For 
example, when the SEC in 2003 ordered mutual funds to turn over information related to 
possible market timing and after-hours trading activity, its request detailed the civil 
penalties for noncompliance.63  Even a “voluntary” request for information may carry an 
implicit risk that failure to demonstrate good faith compliance might subject the firm to a 
closer and more extensive investigation by the regulator.  
Regulators can also reward firms that come forward with needed information.  In 
crafting a new regulation, it is sometimes possible to design a rule, or mode of 
enforcement, to vary the burden imposed on particular industries or firms, effectively 
(though not explicitly) giving favorable treatment to firms that provide information.  As 
we discuss further in Part III, some regulatory agencies have even established recognition 
programs that try to reward firms that act responsibly and are willing to engage in 
information sharing with the agency.  
Beyond creating incentives for individual firms, regulators can use their regulatory 
authority to shape overall industry incentives.  If the government can credibly signal that 
it will issue a new regulation whether or not it receives certain information from the 
industry, firms may choose to disclose otherwise adverse facts in the hope of forestalling 
an even more stringent or costly regulation.  Firms may also find some value from acting 
like a “good citizen” if they think the regulator already has enough information to create 
a regulation that will withstand judicial scrutiny.   Regulators, like shrewd prosecutors 
trying to break down conspirators, may feign more knowledge than they have.
63 See supra note 54.  Section 21c of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 provides for judicial 
enforcement of SEC information demands and criminal penalties for failure to comply.  
- 34 -
Finally, industry’s response to new regulations can give regulators information 
needed to tighten or refine these regulations still further.  For example, the Montreal 
Protocol required a 50 percent reduction in industry’s use of CFCs and established a 
technology assessment panel to identify ways to meet this target.64  Since the entire 
industry now faced incentives for finding ways of reducing their use of CFCs, 
participation on the assessment panel provided an opportunity for firms to pool their 
expertise to achieve innovations.65  The results included new information that proved 
helpful to industry and yielded positive externalities:  the collective search led to the use 
of less harmful chemicals and new technological processes that reduced the use of ozone-
depleting chemicals by more than 95 percent.66
D.  Additional Strategic Considerations.  
Our analysis of regulators’ basic strategies raises three implications.  First, effective 
regulatory decision making depends on more than just scientific, economic, and 
engineering information.  It also requires political information, that is, information about 
the interests and proclivities of affected firms and individuals.  Regulators must 
understand the various interests at stake if they are going to try to exploit asymmetric 
interests, even when using rewards or punishments.  How do regulators find out about 
64
  Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 
U.N.T.S. 293, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1541, 1552-54 (1987).
65 EDWARD A. PARSON, PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER: SCIENCE AND STRATEGY (2003). 
66 Id.
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firms’ interests in disclosure?  Often information about interests comes from ongoing 
interactions between regulators and the industries they regulate.  Regulators may also 
issue advance notices of proposed rulemaking to flush out interests.  In a preplay to the 
main round of the game, the nature and intensity of firms’ responses to regulators’ initial 
forays reveals information about their underlying interests.67
Second, regulators will usually both exploit asymmetries and provide incentives that 
create them.  They may use both strategies in tandem, such as by issuing an information 
request backed up by penalties and also separately (but discretely) targeting individual 
firms with differential interests to obtain other information.  Or they may combine the 
two strategies into one effort, such as by rewarding those firms already most inclined to 
disclose.  They may also stage the two strategies when searching for the same 
information.  Regulators who exploit asymmetries can later try to create incentives.  
Regulatory problems often have several plausible causes, and they almost always 
have several potential solutions.  The value of any particular piece of information for the 
regulator depends on how effectively it fills a gap in the regulator’s knowledge base and 
how important that gap is to the regulator’s overall decision making.  For firms, the costs 
and benefits of providing any given piece of information also vary, depending upon the 
likely consequences of disclosure.  The regulator will thus wish to downplay the 
significance of any information it seeks from a potential source, and to pursue different 
pieces of information from different actors, so that it will be harder for any one of them to 
67 See Johnston, supra note 12.
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see how the pieces fit together.68  In this way, regulators are not unlike the police 
investigating a crime.  They go around asking many people for small bits of information 
and then attempt to piece it all together.  
Firms with a hazy picture of the regulator’s overall puzzle will be less likely to assess 
accurately the value and impact of the release of any particular piece of information.69
Some firms will overestimate the value of their information to the regulator and will 
therefore resist disclosure; others will underestimate the regulator’s use of what they say, 
and will release more information than they otherwise would.  For example, in building 
its case for tobacco regulation, FDA investigators interviewed tobacco farmers about 
some of the experimental crops they grew in an effort to show how the industry had 
developed techniques to control the levels of nicotine in cigarettes.70  Undoubtedly, few 
farmers who talked to agency investigators fully appreciated how the FDA would use 
information about their crops to build a case against the tobacco industry.  And surely no 
experienced government investigator would have conveyed to these farmers that the fate 
of the tobacco industry rested in the information they were being asked to provide.
68
 The regulator will face a tradeoff in deliberately soliciting information from different sources for the 
purpose of avoiding showing all its cards to any single player.  The accuracy and usefulness of information 
may well diminish the more sources from which it comes, especially if different sources used different 
units of measurement and the regulator is unable to convert the data into a common metric.  In such cases, 
the regulator will be better off pursuing information from a single source, even if doing so will reveal more 
fully to that source the value of the information the regulator needs.
69
 Thus, firms have an incentive to cooperate with the regulator when the regulator cooperates in return and 
shares information about the agency’s plans.  See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
70 KESSLER, supra note 31.
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A third consideration emerging from our strategic analysis is that regulators need to 
consider in what order they will pursue different sources of information.71  Regulators 
will want to distinguish between sources of information according to how valuable their 
information is.  It may be better for regulators first to pursue information from sources 
possessing lower information value, building up their base of knowledge so that they can 
later maximize what they learn from their most intelligent sources of information.  Of 
course, since regulators often do not know what they are hunting for, they may not know 
which sources will be most valuable ones until well into an inquiry.  
As a general guideline, regulators should try to exploit asymmetries before attempting 
to create incentives.  A regulator’s initial step in any regulatory proceeding should be to 
determine which firms (or individuals) are likely to have asymmetric interests with 
respect to different pieces of relevant information.72  It may take time to find a willing 
source of information, but if the agency can afford the delay this is generally preferable to 
mandating disclosure, which sets up an adversarial posture that can be difficult or 
impossible to unwind.73  But when regulators believe that there is a low probability of 
finding any cooperative source or if the problem is particularly urgent, it may be better to 
71
  Correspondingly, industry’s collective ability to inflict retribution on those who disclose information 
will also likely vary depending on the order of revelation.  Whether by regulators or by industry, the 
strongest incentives – positive or negative – may be applied to those firms who disclose (or threaten to 
disclose) first.  See Parson, Zeckhauser, & Coglianese, supra note 7.
72
  See infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.  
73 See supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.  
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use their subpoena power at the outset.74  Mandatory disclosure may also be more 
appropriate when regulators are looking for confirmation of something they already 
know.
III. Regulators’ Tactics for Eliciting Information
In this Part, we consider the specific tactics that regulators use to exploit asymmetries 
of interest and to create new incentives for disclosure.  Legal commentators generally 
distinguish between forms of voluntary disclosure of information and compulsory 
disclosure,75 and pay more attention to compulsory inspections and subpoenas, which 
74
   There may also be strategic reasons for regulators to issue subpoenas before exploring other options, 
regardless of the relative merits of mandated disclosure in terms of collecting valuable information.  Issuing 
a subpoena conveys to Congress and the public an impression that the regulator is taking swift action to 
address a problem and it also tends to put the firms that are subject to a subpoena in a bad light, which may 
distract attention from criticisms of the regulator.  Agencies do publicize their issuance of administrative 
subpoenas, behavior that confirms the strategic value to mandated disclosure entirely apart from its value 
for securing information.  For recent accounts of regulators’ high-profile probes into practices in the mutual 
fund industry, see Scott Bernard Nelson, US, State Broaden Inquiry of Funds: More Firms Get Notes 
Seeking Information, The Boston Globe, Sept. 6, 2003, at C1; Ellen Kelleher, US Extends Probe to Include 
Intermediaries, Financial Times, Oct. 13, 2003, at 27; Adrian Michaels, SEC Puts Pressure on Mutuals, 
Financial Times, Oct. 30, 2003, at 16.
75 RICHARD J. PIERCE, I ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 194 (4th ed, 2002) (“[A]lmost all the information 
the agencies receive from private parties comes in voluntarily.  In both adjudication and rulemaking, 
whether formal or informal, private parties voluntarily submit the facts about themselves, and they usually 
answer questionnaires without compulsion.”); JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL, AND PETER M. 
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raise issues about privacy and protections against self-incrimination.76  Yet the tactics 
available to regulators are actually quite diverse:  (a) disclosure as a precondition for 
regulatory decisions; (b) mandatory reporting and access; (c) rewards for disclosure; (d) 
nonmandatory information requests; (e) formal interaction; and (f) informal interaction.  
A.  Conditioning Decisions on Disclosure
Regulators sometimes condition key decisions on the disclosure of information by 
regulated firms.77  For example, companies must submit extensive information to the 
FDA to secure its approval to market new drugs.78 The Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) requires manufacturers of new aircraft to submit extensive test results before the 
SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 5th ed (2003) (“Agencies obtain 
needed information in a variety of ways.  Most of it is provided voluntarily….However, some information 
that government officials require to develop policy…is not willingly disclosed.”).
76
 See, e.g., Carlos B. Castillo, Discord Among Federal Courts of Appeals: The Constitutionality of 
Warrantless Searches of Employers' OSHA Records, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 201 (1990); Susan M. 
McDonough, The Fourth Power? Administrative Searches vs. The Fourth Amendment, 20 N.E. J. ON CRIM. 
& CIV. CON. 195 (1993); Geoffrey G. Hemphill, The Administrative Search Doctrine: Isn't This Exactly 
What the Framers Were Trying to Avoid?, 5 REGENT U. L. REV. 215, 217 (1995).
77
  The Office of Management and Budget estimates that 39.7% of all authorized information collection 
requests are “required to obtain or retain some kind of benefit.”  OMB, Final Report of the Small Business 
Paperwork Relief Task Force 7 (June 27, 2003).
78
 Pharmaceutical firms must file new drug applications that include all the data and findings from any 
clinical trial performed on a drug they would like to market.  21 U.S.C. § 355.  If the agency finds that the 
data show that the drug meets the requirements for safety and efficacy, it will approve the drug for market.  
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agency will certify the design as meeting applicable safety standards.79  While such 
transfers of information take place in case-by- case proceedings instead of general policy 
making, the information about the industry the agency gains may prove helpful in 
subsequent rulemakings by the agency or by other agencies.     
Firms have incentives to submit selective, biased, or even false information to satisfy 
disclosure requirements.80  For example, in its application to market a drug called 
Oraflex, the pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly failed to disclose overseas deaths 
associated with the use of Oraflex.81  By the time the company pleaded guilty and was 
79 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended in sections of 
14, 15, 16, 31, 40, 48, and 49 U.S.C.).  14 C.F.R. § 21.33(b) (manufacturer must make all inspections and 
tests); 14 C.F.R. § 21.35(b) (manufacturer must make all flight tests).  See generally Mark A. Valetti, 
Comment, Preemption of State Law Tort Claims in the Context of Aircraft Manufacturers, 60 J. AIR L. AND 
COM. 699, 705-710 (Dec. 1994/Jan. 1995) (describing the FAA certification process).  In addition, the 
manufacturer must demonstrate that it has in place a quality control system to ensure that its production 
process will consistently produce aircraft that meet the approved design.  See 14 C.F.R. § 21.139; 14 C.F.R. 
§ 21.143 (noting what data must be provided to demonstrate quality control); 14 C.F.R. § 21.135 
(certification will be issued if application meets requirements of § 21.139 and 21.143).   These detailed 
plans describe the processes manufacturers use to meet safety requirements, providing information about 
each firms’ production.
80
  These incentives will be affected by the penalties for submitting inaccurate or incomplete information 
and the probabilities of getting caught.
81
 See Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 
VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1148 n.124 (1993).  See also Morton Mintz, Indictment Accuses Drug-Testing Firm 
of Falsifying Results, THE WASHINGTON POST, Jun. 1, 1979, at A9 (describing allegations of falsification 
by another drug company).
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forced to withdraw the drug from the market, the drug reportedly had caused about 50 
deaths in the United States.82
Regulators usually cannot independently verify the information firms provide, and 
often it is hard to detect subtle inaccuracies in the data or the firms’ analysis.  
Overcoming this problem requires large penalties for false disclosure or ones that apply 
to individual decision makers directly.83  Congress took this approach in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, which increased penalties for corporate fraud and required individual 
certification by CEOs of the accuracy of company filings.84
At times, regulators can use information from firms’ applications submitted to other 
agencies.  For example, to understand the tobacco industry’s techniques, the FDA relied 
on information submitted to the Patent Office in support of tobacco companies’ patent 
applications.  Tobacco companies touted their innovative methods of controlling nicotine 
levels when applying for patents related to cigarette manufacturing; this information later 
helped the FDA build its case that cigarettes were sophisticated drug delivery devices that 
warranted the FDA’s regulatory control.85
82 See Teresa Moran Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1335, 1348 
(1993).
83 See Sidney Shapiro, Divorcing Profit Motivation From New Drug Research: A Consideration of 
Proposals to Provide the FDA with Reliable Test Data, 1978 DUKE L.J. 155, 170 (1978) (questioning the 
ability of FDA officials to detect subtle biases in the data they receive); Schwartz, supra note 82, at 1157-
58.
84
  Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002).
85 KESSLER, supra note 31, at 122-24 (evidence from patent applications showed that industry had 
developed the means of manipulating nicotine levels in cigarettes).  Of course, FDA’s efforts to regulate 
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B.  Mandatory Reporting and Access
Regulators can mandate that firms release information or submit to government audits 
or inspections, with the threat of penalties if firms do not comply.86  Mandated 
information disclosure can take the form of subpoenas, reporting requirements, and 
government inspections of facilities.
It is well established that Congress and the courts have the authority to order the 
disclosure of information.87  Regulatory agencies can also compel businesses or 
individuals to answer questions or produce documents, as long as Congress has given 
them this authority by statute and they request information that is relevant to a legitimate 
tobacco ultimately were not sustained in court, as the U.S. Supreme Court held that tobacco products were 
specifically excluded by statute from FDA’s jurisdiction.  FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
120 S.Ct. 1291 (2000).
86
  The Office of Management and Budget estimates that 38.4% of all authorized information collection 
requests “are mandatory where failure to provide the information required can result in civil, or criminal, 
sanctions.”  OMB, supra note 77, at 7.
87
  Congress has the power to compel witnesses to testify or produce documents so that it can more 
competently exercise its legislative authority.  McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).  See generally
John M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARV. L.REV. 
153, 189 (1926).  Courts can compel the disclosure of information in litigation, which on occasion will 
prove to be an additional source of information for regulators.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 17; Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, 45.  
The litigation filed by smokers and state attorney generals yielded documents helpful to the FDA in its 
rulemaking on cigarettes.  KESSLER, supra note 31.
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agency purpose and is not patently unreasonable.88  The courts allow agencies granted 
such authority to use it to obtain information for rulemaking as well as enforcement.89
Courts have generally deferred to regulators when it comes to enforcing information 
requests, even upholding broad requests for “all papers” or “all documents” related to 
issues of concern to the regulator.90  Indeed, the courts have held that mere “official 
curiosity” is a sufficient purpose for mandatory information requests, provided the 
information requested pertains to a matter within the agency’s authority.91
Regulators can also compel firms to file routine reports that effectively enable 
government to monitor relevant aspects of an industry.  For example, under the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requires 
88
 U.S. v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 654; Endicott Johnson v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943) (agency 
orders will be sustained unless “plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any legal purpose” of the agency).  For 
example, the Federal Trade Commission has the authority “to require by subpoena the attendance and 
testimony of witnesses and the production of all such documentary evidence relating to any matter under 
investigation.”  15 U.S.C. § 49.  However, even when statutes contain authorizations to conduct physical 
inspections of facilities, the Supreme Court has held that in certain situations regulators may be required to 
obtain search warrants prior to making an inspection in the absence of a firm’s consent.  Marshall v. 
Barlow’s, 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
89
 FTC Line of Business Report Litigation, 595 F.2d 685, 702.
90 Id. at 703 (“When the inquiry is conducted pursuant to a lawful purpose and the request is relevant to that 
objective, its reasonableness will be presumed absent a showing that compliance threatens to disrupt or 
unduly hinder the normal operations of a business.”).  See also Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, Phillips 
Petroleum v. Lujan, 951 F.2d 257, 260, (10th Cir. 1991).
91 Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652.
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companies to disclose scientific studies they have conducted on toxic substances92 and to 
report data on production levels of chemicals listed on the agency’s Chemical Substances 
Inventory.93 The EPA uses such data to help set priorities, assess new risks, and establish 
and implement agency regulations.94  Firms that fail to report the required information 
may face court-ordered fines of up to $25,000 per day for each violation.  
Mandatory reporting does have the advantage that it may overcome selection bias, as 
voluntary disclosure is more likely to elicit information from a unrepresentative sample 
of firms, namely those with favorable information to reveal.95  Unfortunately, such 
mandatory extractions suffer three shortcomings.  First, requests for information can be 
politically unpopular, particularly if they require a lot of effort by the industry to respond 
to them.  To limit government information requests, for example, Congress has adopted 
the Paperwork Reduction Act, which requires agencies to obtain approval from OMB for 
92
 Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2607(d); 40 C.F.R. § 716.
93 See 15 U.S.C. § 2607; Partial Updating of TSCA Inventory Data Base; Production and Site Reports, 51 
Fed. Reg. 21,438 (Jun. 12, 1986).
94
 Partial Updating of TSCA Inventory Data Base; Production and Site Reports, 50 Fed. Reg. 9944 
(proposed Mar. 12, 1985) (stating that EPA uses the information it receives to “set priorities for further 
investigation, … to estimate, along with other data, the potential for human and environmental exposure to 
specific substances, to support the implementation of various TSCA regulations, and to perform economic 
impact analyses for potential TSCA regulations”).
95
 For an analogous scenario in the regulation of disclosure of information to consumers, see Howard 
Beales, Richard Craswell, and Steven Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Regulation, 24 J. L. & 
ECON. 491, 537 (1981) (noting that when disclosure is voluntary “information will usually be disclosed 
only by sellers of whom it speaks well”).
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any information requests that ask identical questions of more than ten individuals or 
companies.96  Second, to be effective, mandatory information requests require that the 
regulator already has enough information to know what issues to ask about.  Firms are 
unlikely to respond to a subpoena by volunteering information beyond what is required.  
Third, it is generally hard for government to determine whether firms have provided 
complete responses.  A failure to make any response will be clear, but it is extremely 
difficult to demonstrate omission or evasion if the firm responds with at least some 
information.  A recent amnesty program administered by the EPA under TSCA shows the 
nondisclosure problem can be extensive.  The EPA established a five-year amnesty 
period, waiving penalties for firms that came forward with studies on toxic substances 
they had previously failed to disclose.97  Companies disclosed 11,000 old studies that had 
previously gone undisclosed.98
C.  Rewards for Disclosure
The EPA’s amnesty program was actually an example of a reward for disclosure.  
Through this program, the EPA offered firms something of value – namely, amnesty – in 
96
  44 U.S.C. § 3502(3).
97 See Marianne Lavelle, EPA’s Amnesty Has Become a Mixed Blessing: Be Careful What You Ask For, 
NAT. L.J., Feb. 24, 1997, at A1.
98 Id. Some companies claimed that they had failed to submit the older studies because of ambiguity about 
whether they were required to do so, not out of any obstructionist intent.  A similar amnesty program for 
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exchange for information.  Regulators’ rewards are often much more discreet.  For 
example, regulators may become valued and trusted sources of information about agency 
activities for industry representatives who are valued and trusted sources of information 
for regulators.  
Although difficult to document, it is plausible that regulators sometimes design rules 
that subtly reward firms that provide information.99  In negotiations over multi-state 
tobacco litigation, for example, the Liggett Group sought special treatment in part 
because the company had previously reached a deal releasing documents that revealed the 
tobacco industry’s efforts to cover up smoking’s hazards.100
production data for chemicals listed on EPA’s inventory apparently netted new information from about 250 
companies.  Id.
99
 For example, government could adopt a technology-based standard that locks in a technology that the 
firm already uses would put competitors at a disadvantage, whereas a performance-based standard might 
not.  
100 Tobacco’s Crumbling Barricades, NEW YORK TIMES, March 22, 1997, p. 22.  Liggett also claimed it 
could not afford its share of the settlement.  CARRICK MOLLENKAMP ET AL., THE PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO
224 (1998).  In the end, however, Liggett was unable to secure an exemption from the terms of the 
settlement, in large part because the rest of the industry closed ranks.  Id. at 224, 233.  Although this is an 
example of information disclosure in litigation, for an argument that large-scale litigation over social issues 
such as tobacco has effectively become a form of regulation, see W. KIP VISCUSI, ED., REGULATION 
THROUGH LITIGATION (2002).
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Over an extended time, many opportunities will arise for regulators to offer implicit 
benefits to firms that release relevant and accurate information.101  In repeated 
interaction, especially when information is the currency of exchange, building a 
reputation matters since a regulator needs to be able to trust the information provided to it 
by an industry source.  By providing information adverse to its interests, at least once in a 
while, a firm can bolster its credibility as an industry source, making it more likely that 
the government will grant the firm some implicit benefit -- if only by believing the firm 
even when other information it shares seems self-serving.  This is especially relevant for 
information about industry costs or technological feasibility.
Regulators have also developed programs that deliver explicit inducements to 
firms if they deliver helpful information to the government.  These programs, which are 
often justified as efforts to reward firms for achieving outcomes superior to what is 
normally required, also allow regulators to learn about best practices.  For example, in the 
area of environmental and occupational safety regulation, agencies now offer explicit 
benefits to encourage firms to participate in various pilot projects or reveal information 
about their management practices.  Firms that commit to taking on extra measures and 
are willing to provide the government with more information about their products or 
101
  Given that many firms and trade associations are engaged in long term, repeated interaction with 
regulatory officials, they will find benefits over the long term from cooperative and open dealing with 
government.  ROBERT AXELROD, EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); Coglianese, supra note 6.
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practices than is normally required receive special recognition, reduced enforcement 
scrutiny, and in sometimes outright exemptions from existing standards.102
For example, after receiving a series of health complaints from neighbors of large 
animal feedlot operations, the EPA began investigating whether it should take regulatory 
action to address the situation.  To collect information, the EPA initiated negotiations 
with firms to induce them to implement monitoring systems on their facilities to provide 
EPA with data on the pollutants in the air at feedlots.103  In exchange for firms’ 
willingness to install monitoring devices, the EPA reportedly offered to “give farm 
operators amnesty for any Clean Air Act violations” that the Agency uncovered through 
the monitoring program.104
Another type of inducement offers exemptions from existing regulations.105  EPA’s 
Project XL, established in the mid-1990s, allows the EPA to grant waivers if firms show 
that they will use alternative methods of pollution reduction that will yield better 
environmental results than the methods specified under current regulations.106  Intel, for 
102 See generally David W. Case, The EPA’s Environmental Stewardship Initiative: Attempting to 
Revitalize a Floundering Regulatory Reform Agenda, 50 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (2001); Cary Coglianese & 
Jennifer Nash, Policy Options for Improving Environmental Management in the Private Sector, 44 
ENVIRONMENT 10 (November 2002) (describing government programs to recognize best practices).
103
  Jennifer Lee, Neighbors of Vast Hog Farms Say Foul Air Endangers Their Health, New York Times, 
May 11, 2003.
104
 Id.
105 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward 
a Bounded Pragmatism, 97 MINN. L. REV. 943, 965-970 (2003).
106 See EPA, Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (May 23, 1995).
- 49 -
example, devised an alternative strategy for reducing air pollution at one of its Arizona 
semiconductor facilities in exchange for the EPA’s waiving certain regulatory permitting 
requirements.107  Project XL was designed in part to provide the EPA with information 
about alternative environmental strategies that the agency could use to develop new 
environmental regulations or revise old ones.108  Firms applying for waivers must provide 
the EPA with a substantial amount of information about the alternative strategies they 
propose and submit to an ongoing monitoring regimen.109
Both the EPA and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) also 
offer public recognition as an inducement to gather information from firms that exhibit 
107 See John H. Cushman, Jr., E.P.A. and Arizona Factory Agree on Innovative Regulatory Plan, N. Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 20, 1996, at A18.  See also Lawrence E. Susskind & Joshua Secunda, The Risks and the 
Advantages of Agency Discretion: Evidence from EPA's Project XL, 17 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 67 
(1998-99); Daniel Fiorino, Toward a New System of Environmental Regulation: The Case for an Industry 
Sector Approach, 26 ENVTL. L. 457 (1996); Allen Blackman & Jan Mazurek, The Cost of Developing Site-
Specific Environmental Regulations: Evidence from EPA's Project XL, Resources for the Future 
Discussion Paper No. 99-35 (Apr. 1999).
108
  Thomas E. Caballero, Project XL:  Making It Legal, Making It Work, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 399 (1998) 
(“The Clinton administration conceived Project XL  as a means of experimenting with new methods of 
controlling and reducing pollution through pilot projects. The knowledge gained from the projects was 
supposed to facilitate the modification of environmental regulations and controls.”).    For a further 
discussion of the purposes of Project XL, see Dennis D. Hirsch, Project XL and the Special Case: The 
EPA's Untold Success Story, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 219, 220-227 (2001); ALFRED A. MARCUS, ET AL., 
REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM PROJECT XL (2002).
109 See EPA, 60 Fed. Reg. at 27,287 (noting that one of the requirements is monitoring, reporting and 
evaluation of the program).
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best practices in environmental and workplace safety management.  OSHA’s Voluntary 
Protection Programs (VPP), created in 1982, has more than 1,000 member facilities 
nationwide.110  Under the VPP program, OSHA exempts from regular inspections 
employers who demonstrate a strong record in health and safety and have approved 
health and safety programs in place.111  As part of the application process, OSHA 
conducts a rigorous “pre-approval review” that provides the agency with information 
about firms’ health and safety measures.112  OSHA also goes on-site to inspect the 
employer’s past safety records, review its policies and procedures for ensuring health and 
safety, and interview managers and employees about the policies and controls.113  These 
visits ensure that facilities meet the program requirements; they also allow OSHA to 
secure a great deal of information about workplace safety that it then can use to identify 
problems at nonparticipating firms.  The participating firms, in return, escape from the 
regular rulebook inspections.  In 1993, EPA launched an Environmental Leadership 
Program (ELP), modeled on OSHA’s VPP, which recognized industrial facilities that had 
delivered exemplary environmental results.114  This program, and other EPA programs 
like it, eventually grew into what the EPA now calls its National Environmental 
110 See Voluntary Protection Programs To Supplement Enforcement and To Provide Safe and Healthful 
Working Conditions, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,025 (Jul. 2, 1982).
111 See id. at 29,029.  Of course, OSHA still reviews worker complaints and accidents and retains its 
enforcement authority if the site is not meeting its regulatory obligations.  See id. at 29,030.
112 See id. at 29,030; see also Michael, supra note 28, at 559-61 (discussing generally the requirements for 
the program).
113 See 47 Fed. Reg. at 29,030.   
114 See Environmental Leadership Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 4,802 (Jan. 15, 1993).
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Performance Track (NEPT), which recognizes more than 300 facilities across the nation 
for their environmental excellence.115
Facilities that are admitted into OSHA’s VPP and EPA’s Performance Track are 
eligible to join membership associations – the VPP Participants Association and the 
Performance Track Participants Association, respectively – that have regular meetings 
with the agencies, benefiting both the industry members and the agencies.  Regulators 
report that that they have learned valuable information from these programs about 
industry practices and management techniques.116  As one EPA official summed up the 
information value from programs like Performance Track, “We need people we can talk 
to.”  
D. Nonmandatory Information Requests
Regulators can ask firms to provide information without offering any rewards or 
threatening any penalties.  OMB estimates that 21.9 percent of authorized information 
collection requests “are voluntary where a response is entirely discretionary and has no 
115
  EPA, National Environmental Performance Track Basic Information, available at
http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/about.htm.  Other forerunners to Performance Track included the 
Strategic Goals Program in the metal finishing sector and the StarTrack program implemented in EPA 
Region 1.  
116 See David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor 
Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917, 955 (2001).
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direct effect on any benefit or privilege for the respondent.”117  Undoubtedly, many more 
such requests are either made without authorization or do not rise to the level where 
OMB authorization is needed.
Regulators often send voluntary surveys to firms to collect data on regulatory 
problems, industry conditions, and the financial costs of regulation.  For example, the 
EPA has surveyed regulated water systems about every five years since 1976,118
collecting information about the current conditions of water systems to help it calculate 
the costs of drinking water regulations and assess any potential needs for new water 
quality technologies.119  In 2000, the agency surveyed about 1,800 different water 
systems, mailing surveys to about 1,200 medium and large systems and sending 
representatives from consulting firms to collect data in person from 600 small systems.  
The response rate for the small systems was 90 percent, while the rate for all systems was 
69 percent.120
117
  OMB, supra note 77, at 7 (emphasis in original).  Even though such requests are technically 
nonbinding, some firms may perceive that they have little choice but to cooperate.  We mean to address 
here those instances where firms truly do have (and perceive that they have) a choice about whether to 
disclose, acknowledging that in many cases what looks like a voluntary request may well be tacitly backed 
up in subtle ways with some threat of punitive response for those who do not participate.
118
 Agency Information Collection Activities: Proposed Collection; Comment Request; Community Water 
System Survey, 65 FED. REG. 7544 (Feb. 15, 2000) (describing the purpose and design of the survey).
119 Id. at 7545.
120 See Community Water System Survey 2000, at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/consumer/cwss_2000_
volume_i.pdf, at p. vi.
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In the late 1980s, OSHA surveyed more than 5,000 companies on the use of personal 
protective equipment (PPE) in various industrial sectors.121  The results enabled OSHA to 
identify workplace risks, determine the feasibility of new or revised standards, and 
provide a baseline for assessing the effectiveness of any regulatory changes.122  To help 
ensure the adequacy and accuracy of responses, OSHA conducted the survey by 
telephone and used strict measures to protect the confidentiality of survey responses.123
Regulators can also ask firms to submit to voluntary inspections.  Following 
September 11, 2001, EPA asked several dozen chemical facilities to submit to site visits 
so the agency could gather information about the adequacy of security practices at 
chemical facilities, as well as assess security vulnerabilities and identify potential 
solutions.124  EPA currently has little or no legal authority to compel firms to submit to 
such inspections, but was able to elicit cooperation from a few facilities.  The FDA
121 See Agency Information Collection Activities Under OMB Review; Personal Protective Equipment, 
Survey, 53 FED. REG. 28,462 (Jul. 28, 1988).  Personal protective equipment includes items such as safety 
goggles and hearing protectors.
122 Id.  
123
 Even purely voluntary surveys must still receive approval by the OMB under the Paperwork Reduction 
Act (PRA) (44 U.S.C. § 3501 et seq). See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Paperwork Redux: The (Stronger) 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 49 ADMIN L. REV. 111, 115 (1997).  The burden on responding 
companies with respect to cost and time is one factor that OMB considers when deciding whether to 
approve information collection requests by agencies.
124
 Robert Westervelt, GAO Calls for National Chemical Security Plan, Chemical Week, March 26, 2003, 
at 7; Neil Franz, ACC Pushes for Compromise on Security Legislation, Chemical Week, December 18, 
2002, at 12; EPA Addresses Chemical Site Security, Slowly, Occupational Hazards, February 2003.
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similarly had no authority to inspect cigarette plants, but once Commissioner Kessler 
began to take an interest in regulating tobacco, the CEO of Philip Morris agreed to show 
FDA around one of his company’s facilities.125  Until that visit, “no one on the team 
[developing the FDA rule] had ever been inside a tobacco manufacturing plant.”126
Regulators need to be mindful of when the generalizability of their findings is suspect 
from surveys or site inspections.  While regulations bind all the firms within a sector, 
firms may be most eager to volunteer information when they are unlike their competitors.  
Regulators must also worry about the accuracy of self-reported survey results, as firms’ 
responses may be biased.  
E. Formal Interaction
Formal interaction between industry and regulatory officials provides another mode 
of gathering information.   Formal interaction takes place in public and usually follows a 
variety of procedural steps.  Examples include public hearings, where agency staff sit and 
listen to testimony from industry,127 and the written comments that industry and others 
125 KESSLER, supra note 31, at 140-41.  Of course, this probably is an example of the situation noted supra, 
in note 116, where a firm’s cooperation was not strictly voluntary.  Given the background threat of the 
FDA regulating tobacco, Philip Morris most likely was using this gesture of voluntary disclosure in an 
effort to stave off or at least mitigate FDA’s regulatory initiative.
126 Id. at 141.
127
 Public hearings can take place as part of what is known as “formal rulemaking” under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, but proceedings that require this on-the-record, trial-type procedure are 
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submit to the agency during the rulemaking process.128  Industry tends to submit the 
largest proportion of comments in most rulemakings, comments that are filled with 
extensive data, suggestions, and objections that can sometimes span hundreds of pages 
(and are undoubtedly mostly self-serving).129  All written comments and transcripts from 
hearings are documented in an agency’s records and are available to the public.130
The approximately 1,000 advisory committees established by federal regulatory 
agencies provide another opportunity for formal interaction.131  Congress has recognized 
relatively rare.  However, public hearings can also be used to provide supplementary input into so-called 
“informal” or “notice-and-comment” rulemaking.  5 U.S.C. § 553. 
128
  The drafters of the Administrative Procedure Act, which specifies that agencies provide opportunities 
for public comment, specifically had in mind that the “the objective should be to assure informed 
administrative action.” Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947).
129 See Cary Coglianese, supra note 6, at 741 (noting that “industry groups (i.e., business firms and trade 
associations) participated the most” in the comment process); WESLEY MAGAT ALAN KRUPNICK, & 
WINSTON HARRINGTON, RULES IN THE MAKING 40 (1986); Marissa Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-
making Process: Who Participates? Which Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 252, 253 
(1998).
130
  Anyone interested in the information must still visit the agency to obtain it, at least for most agencies.  
A few agencies, like EPA and the Department of Transportation, have begun to post all their comments in 
Internet-accessible dockets.  Within a few years, regulatory comments submitted to all agencies will 
probably be accessible on-line.
131
 General Services Administration, FACA Database, available at http://fido.gov/facadatabase/default.asp  
See also General Services Administration, Annual Report of the President on Federal Advisory 
Committees.  The number of advisory bodies is actually larger than the widely cited figure of 1,000 
because some advisory committees have distinct subcommittees or other associated working groups.
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that such advisory groups “are frequently a useful and beneficial means of furnishing 
expert advice, ideas, and diverse opinions.”132  The Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), for example, uses the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee “to obtain 
direct, firsthand information and insight from the substantially affected interests by 
meeting together and exchanging ideas with respect to proposed rules and existing 
rules.”133  ARAC advises the FAA on most major policy issues, including equipment 
safety, flight crew training, communication systems, and aircraft noise.  The FAA 
believes this information enables the agency to craft “better rules in less overall time.”134
In 1994, the EPA established a new advisory committee that met regularly for several 
years in an effort to identify innovative approaches to environmental regulation across six 
industrial sectors.135  Called the Common Sense Initiative (CSI) Council, the advisory 
committee included about 30 representatives from industry, trade associations, state and 
local government, labor, environmental groups, and community organizations.136  In 
132 Id. at § 2.  
133 ARAC Charter.
134 Id.  DOT employs similar committees, with similar objectives, in its other branches, such as the 
Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) used by the Federal Railroad Administration and the 
Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee (THLPSSC) used by the Office of 
Pipeline Safety.
135
 Common Sense Initiative Council Federal Advisory Committee; Establishment, 59 FED. REG. 55,117 
(Nov. 3, 1994).
136 See David W. Case, The EPA’s Environmental Stewardship Initiative: Attempting to Revitalize a 
Floundering Regulatory Reform Agenda, 50 EMORY L.J. 1, 43 (1993) (discussing generally the CSI 
program).
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addition, subcommittees were created for each of the six sectors included in CSI: metal 
finishing, computers and electronics, automobile manufacturing, printing, petroleum 
refining, and iron and steel.137  Although the CSI process did not ultimately lead to major 
changes in environmental regulation, it did help inform EPA policymakers about 
technical issues in each of its industrial sectors.138  Indeed, much of the activity 
undertaken in the Common Sense Initiative consisted of research and information 
collection.139
Formal interaction enables regulators to gather information, but the openness 
associated with these processes can limit the sharing of information.  As with gossip in 
everyday life, information transmission to regulators is more efficient through less formal 
137 See Katherine Bouma, Metal Finishers Try EPA Program, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 27, 1998, at A7.
138
 Cary Coglianese & Laurie Allen, Building Sector-Based Consensus: A Review of the EPA’s Common 
Sense Initiative, in THEO DE BRUIJN & VICKI NORBERG-BOHM, EDS., INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION
(forthcoming).  Some observers of consensus-based advisory committees like CSI have argued that these 
processes help provide regulatory decision makers with better information.  See, e.g., Neil Eisner, 
Regulatory Negotiation: A Real World Experience, 31 FED. BAR N. & J. 371, 374 (1984) (concluding that a 
negotiated rulemaking advisory committee established by the FAA resulted in deliberations that “were 
informative” and that “a better understanding of the problems was developed on all sides”).  It far from 
clear, however, whether information disclosure is significantly increased when advisory committees are 
charged with reaching a consensus on a regulatory proposal.  Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of 
Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 386, 442 (2001) (noting that forms of interaction not 
organized around consensus provide the same kinds of opportunities for public input and that “it is the 
deliberation—not the consensus—that generates the information that enables agencies to craft their policy 
decisions”).
139 Id. at Table 2.
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interaction.  Advisory committees, which must include members of competing interests 
and be open to the public, inhibit frank informational exchange between regulators and 
industry.140  While procedures that promote openness may well help address concerns 
about illegitimate influence by industry on government policy making,141 they can 
hamper the ability to gather information from industry.142
140
  Ashley C. Brown, Sunshine May Cloud Good Decision Making, FORUM APPL. RES. & PUB. POL.
(1992).  The burden associated with establishing FACA committees may also limit the extent to which they 
are used by regulators.  Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and 
Good Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451, 549 (1997).  Whenever agencies convene a series of ongoing 
meetings with a group of industry or other nongovernmental representatives, they must follow the 
requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).  5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 1-15.  The requirements 
under FACA do not apply to the individual and sporadic meetings with industry that take place most 
frequently in regulatory policy making.  See Croley & Funk, supra at 453.  FACA requires agencies to have 
balanced committee memberships drawn from different interest groups, that meetings be announced in 
advance and open to the public, and that the agency take accurate minutes of the committee’s proceedings.  
5 U.S.C. §§5(b)(2), 10(a)(3), & 10(c).  For example, OMB must approve all new proposals for advisory 
committees.  Management of Federal Advisory Committees, O.M.B. Circ. No. A-135 (Oct. 5, 1994).  OMB 
has also established ceilings for the number of advisory committees.  Id.
141
  Croley & Funk, supra note 139, at 453 (noting that in enacting FACA Congress’s attempted to address 
concerns that “some interests had come to enjoy unchecked and perhaps illicit access to federal executive 
decisionmakers.”).
142 See infra Part IV.
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F. Informal Interaction
Informal interaction, which is not nearly as visible as formal exchange, is a staple of 
regulatory life.143  It often takes place by telephone.  In a recent rulemaking proceeding 
on motorcycle brake systems, a staff member at NHTSA called up a representative at the 
motorcycle trade association to learn more about the effect of temperature on the friction 
between brake linings and discs.144  Informal communication also takes place in person, 
in meetings regulators hold with individual representatives from industry, and in working 
groups of such representatives arranged so that they skirt the requirements of the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act.145  Regulators interact with industry at professional meetings, 
143
 Over fifty percent of the Washington interest groups surveyed by Neil Kerwin and Scott Furlong 
reported that government proactively initiated contact with their organizations “on a regular basis.”  
CORNELIUS KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 189 
(3d ed. 2003).  According to Kerwin, “a common reason for these contacts is to get information for the rule 
under development.”  Id.  See also Home Box Office v. Federal Communications Commission, 567 F. 2d 9, 
57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (describing “informal contacts between agencies and the public [as] the ‘bread and 
butter’ of the process of administration”).
144
 Memorandum of George Soodoo, Division Leader, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
Docket NHTSA-99-6472-7 (June 18, 2001).
145
  FACA does not apply to all meetings between regulators and industry.  For example, agency officials 
are permitted to meet alone with an individual, because an individual cannot be a committee.  See 41 C.F.R. 
§ 101-6.1004(h) (meeting initiated by President or agency to seek advice from single individual not subject 
to FACA).  Moreover, the General Services Administration (GSA), which has been charged with 
implementing FACA throughout the federal government, explicitly excludes from its definition of advisory 
committee any meeting where “the purpose is the exchanging of facts or information” as opposed to giving 
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academic conferences, and wherever both industry and government representatives are 
present.146
Government regulators and industry representatives often develop relationships over 
periods of years, or even decades, and will work closely with each other on the 
development of regulations.147  As one EPA staff member explained:
We try to bring them in as early as possible on what we are required to do and 
request their help very early on.  And usually this is appreciated because that 
way they have input as opposed to EPA unilaterally going out and looking at 
various textbooks and writing rules that are ridiculous because we don’t fully 
advice or making recommendation.  41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1004(l).  See also 5 U.S.C. § 3(2) (defining an 
advisory committee as one that is “established or utilized…in the interest of obtaining advice or 
recommendations”).  But see Croley & Funk, supra note 139, at 488 (questioning GSA’s interpretation).  
Even meetings where advice is given can be excluded from FACA if the advice is given individually by 
participants, as opposed to meetings that lead to collective recommendations.  See Croley & Funk, supra
note 139, at 474; 41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1004(i).  Finally, to fall under FACA, meetings need to be held more 
than once, so ad hoc or one-time meetings generally do not need to meet FACA’s requirements.  See
Croley & Funk, supra note 139, at 483-84. 
146
  Coglianese, supra note 6, at 750.  An excellent example of a setting that was specifically designed to 
promote such informal interaction is the Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG), established by our 
colleague, Professor William Hogan.  HEPG brings together representatives from industry, government, 
academe, and environmental groups for discussions aimed at “informing and analyzing” policy 
development.  Harvard Electricity Policy Group, Reshaping the Electricity Industry: A Public Policy 
Debate (June 2001).
147 See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline, L & POL. (1987).
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understand what the hell we are regulating.  So it works out better by working 
very closely with the people that we are going to regulate and we do this in 
various ways.  We meet with them; we have industry-agency workgroups that 
will meet together.148
Another EPA staff member expressed the same thought:  “The more information 
[industry] can help us with, the better the rule will turn out – in their interest as well as 
everyone else’s.”149
Industry representatives in Washington also seek out information from regulators and 
try to learn of opportunities to influence the shape of regulatory policy.150  As one 
corporate vice-president for regulatory affairs remarked:
Our Washington office – they know the regulators down in the bowels of the 
agency personally.  They are over there all the time, they’ve become friends 
with them, they supply data and assist them in any way that it’s legitimate to do.  
So we have open communications constantly about what they’re thinking, what 
148
  Coglianese, supra note 6, at 751.
149 Id.
150
  Political scientists who study the role of interest groups in policy making have long acknowledged that 
lobbyists traffic in information.  See LEWIS ANTHONY DEXTER, HOW ORGANIZATIONS ARE REPRESENTED 
IN WASHINGTON 130 (1969) (“The effective Washington representative provides influence for his client by 
acquiring and translating relevant information.”).
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we’d like them to do, what we think they’re gonna do.  It’s almost like 
becoming joined at the hip with the staff over there.151
In this way, informal interaction serves industry’s interests as well as government’s 
needs, which means that regulators are in a position to offer information about their plans 
to industry in exchange for industry providing government with information.152
While in formal regulatory proceedings conducted through a trial-type hearing, such 
so-called ex parte communications are prohibited under  § 557(d)(1) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, there is no corresponding provision for ex parte 
communications during informal or notice-and-comment rulemaking.   The D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals’ controversial decision in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,153 although 
construed narrowly by subsequent courts,154 has been reinforced by agency policies 
151
 Coglianese, supra note 6, at 751.
152 Id. at 750 (noting that “informational dependence … lead[s] interest group representatives and agency 
staff to find themselves engaged in ongoing and often mutually beneficial relationships”).
153
 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“If ex parte contacts [occur after the issuance of a notice of proposed 
rulemaking], we think that any written document or a summary of any oral communication must be placed 
in the public file established for each rulemaking docket immediately after the communication is received 
so that interested parties may comment thereon.”); see also id. (“[C]ommunications which are received 
prior to issuance of a formal notice of rulemaking do not, in general, have to be put in a public file.”).
154
  United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied 453 U.S. 913 
(1981) (declining to apply ex parte requirement in Home Box Office to OSHA notice-and-comment 
rulemaking); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (declining to follow Home Box Office
requirement in EPA notice-and-comment rulemaking).
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requiring the documentation of informal contacts that take place after the publication of a 
notice of proposed rulemaking.155  Even though some agencies require their staff to 
document all ex parte communications whenever they occur; it is extremely difficult to 
ensure that staff members comply fully with these requirements.  In addition, the 
memoranda that agency staff members prepare to describe their ex parte communications 
are often quite brief and general.  Since the informal communications frequently involve 
contact with only a single agency staff member, there is often no way to know for sure 
whether documentation of ex parte communications is complete.  The upshot is that 
informal contacts with industry continue to take place largely below the radar, especially 
prior to the filing of a notice of proposed rulemaking.156
One additional pattern of interaction deserves mention: the so-called “revolving 
door.”157  When regulators move from government into jobs within industry, this 
facilitates future informal contacts between the regulatory agency and relevant firms or 
trade associations.  When people move from industry into government, this facilitates 
informal contacts and brings insider’s knowledge about an industry into a regulatory 
155 See, e.g., Department of Transportation Order No. 2100.2 (1970) (requiring prompt and public 
documentation of ex parte communications after the publication of the notice of proposed rulemaking); 
Environmental Protection Agency, Administrator’s Memorandum of May 31, 1985 (requiring agency staff 
to place in the docket “a memorandum summarizing any significant new factual data or information likely 
to affect the final decision received during a meeting or other conversations”).  
156 Cf. Coglianese, supra note 6, at 75 (“In the rule development phase, industry groups tend to dominate 
because of the information they can provide to the agency staff as they write a rule.”).
157 See, e.g., William T. Gormley, Jr., A Test of the Revolving Door Hypothesis at the FCC, 23 AMER. J. 
POL. SCI. 665 (1979).
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agency.  FDA Commissioner David Kessler made sure to include on the cigarette 
regulation project an FDA staff member who had previously worked for “the other side” 
– the tobacco industry.158
IV.  The Implications of Information Gathering
How can regulators best use the information-gathering tactics at their disposal to 
gather reliable information from firms that would prefer to remain silent?  In this Part, we 
connect the information-gathering tactics presented in Part III with the general 
informational strategy developed in Part II, emphasizing the strategic advantages of 
informal interactions with industry.  These advantages lead to some striking implications 
for administrative law, which we explain in the final section.  For at least the past three 
decades, administrative law has promoted greater procedural transparency of government 
decision making to discourage regulatory capture and other special deals between 
regulators and the firms they regulate.159  However, the potential adverse impacts of 
transparency and formalism on government’s ability to collect essential information from 
industry have been generally overlooked.
158 KESSLER, supra note 31, at 125.
159 See infra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
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A.  Connecting Tactics with Strategies
Which of the various information-gathering tactics exploit asymmetries of interests 
across or within firms, and which create incentives for disclosure?  Some of the tactics 
clearly match up with regulators’ two basic strategies.  Issuing subpoenas and rewarding 
disclosure are obvious ways to create incentives.  Nonmandatory requests for information 
clearly seek to exploit asymmetries of interest, as the firms or facilities that open 
themselves up to voluntary inspection by the regulator, or that voluntarily respond to 
information requests, presumably have an interest in being forthright with the 
regulator.160
The connection between strategy and the other tactics may seem less clear, at least at 
first glance.  Making regulatory decisions contingent on disclosure might appear to 
reward firms for disclosing information, since firms only obtain their license or 
regulatory approval after they have provided the regulator with information.  But in fact, 
firms are rewarded only for disclosing a certain kind of information -- information 
favorable to the firm -- not when they disclose adverse information showing their 
products or drugs are unsafe.  The cases of fraud in FDA applications for new drugs 
indicate that the tactic of conditioning approval on disclosure does not really help the 
160
  Moreover, the fact that surveys or inspections are treated confidentially means that participating firms 
can usually transmit information without fear of any reprisals from others in their industry.  In some cases, 
others will know that the agency is asking for information, but they will generally never be able to identify 
what information has actually been conveyed or by whom.
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regulator obtain information that most industrial players would prefer it not to have.161
Linking approval to disclosure exacerbates industry’s predisposition to disclose self-
serving information.
Conditioning decisions on disclosure works best when firms’ disclosure interests are 
asymmetric – say if the information that helps one firm win regulatory approval also 
helps the regulator in regulating other firms in the future, on the same or some other 
issue.  When the FDA relied on information submitted with tobacco company patent 
applications, it actually exploited an asymmetry in interest that cut across time.162  When 
they submitted patent applications, tobacco companies had an interest in disclosing 
information about their ability to manipulate nicotine to the Patent Office; they may not 
have even envisioned that a different regulator, the FDA, would later use that information 
against them in trying to regulate cigarettes.  Similarly, in large, compartmentalized 
organizations, individuals in one office may release certain information when applying 
for regulatory approvals falling within their domain, overlooking or underestimating the 
negative implications for future policy making or on regulatory matters outside their 
purview.  
The tactic of formal interaction serves neither of the regulators’ main strategies very 
well.  It generally places regulators in a relatively passive role in which they receive 
information but do not actively seek it.  While information is obviously transmitted in 
public hearings and formal comment periods, it is only information that the parties want 
them to receive, not necessarily the information that regulators most need.  As with 
161 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
162 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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respondents to nonmandatory requests for information, those who attend hearings or take 
the time to file comments are a self-selected group of interested parties.  Moreover, 
unlike nonmandatory requests, formal modes of interaction such as hearings and 
comment processes are open-ended, so the regulator often cannot effectively direct the 
subject matter of the inquiry.  It is hard to see how regulators could use such passive 
modes to exploit asymmetric incentives or create new ones.163
Other types of formal interaction, such as advisory committees, may better enable 
regulators to exploit asymmetries or create incentives for firms to reveal adverse 
information.  Since membership on an advisory committee can reward firms by giving 
them greater access to the agency, the ability to appoint members to these committees in 
principle allows regulators to reward firms that have a track record of providing reliable 
and useful information.  However, a variety of factors constrain the effectiveness of 
advisory committees.  Once a committee is constituted, regulators have little opportunity 
within the confines of the formal process to reward firms that reveal needed information 
during committee deliberations.  Any “deals” that the regulator might like to make with 
individuals firms are inhibited by the transparency of the advisory committee process.  
Moreover, advisory committees must represent a balanced collection of members, so that 
163 See John Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizen Advisory Boards in Environmental 
Decisionmaking, 73 IND. L.J. 901 (1998) (“While procedures like public hearings can be a good 
opportunity for many people to hear presentations, to express their views, and perhaps to engage in 
question-and-answer sessions, they cannot provide the forum for extensive development of information.”).
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regulators cannot merely appoint members from firms that reveal information.164  Most 
important, the requirement that advisory committee deliberations remain open to the 
public means that any firm’s decision to break an industry’s collective silence would be 
known to those who could punish that firm.165  For these reasons, advisory committees do 
not provide regulators with a powerful tool for breaking industry silence.  Surely the 
FDA never would have gathered much information for its cigarette rulemaking by 
appointing tobacco representatives to an advisory committee.
The chief contribution of advisory committees may be, ironically, to facilitate 
informal interactions.  Even though regulators may not learn much from the formal 
meetings of advisory committees, these sessions do give regulators and industry 
representatives opportunities to get to know each other and build relationships that can 
lead to productive informal interaction.  In many cases, the most valuable 
164
 41 C.F.R. §101-6.1007 (requiring agency plan to ensure that the agency strives “to attain fairly balanced 
membership”).  Of course, some advisory committees will be more wide-ranging than others, just given the 
make-up of the interest group community around the issue.  On those issues that are relatively obscure or 
technical, and where the interest group universe is relatively tight, it might be possible for regulators to 
choose precisely the actors most likely to disclose.  On issues where there is a broader and more conflicted 
range of interests, this will be harder to achieve.
165
 5 U.S.C. §10.  To be sure, agencies can always interact with the members of advisory committees on an 
individual basis, outside of the open committee process.  In some cases, regulators may use the formal 
process as a vehicle for forging closer relationships with potential sources of information who the 
regulators then approach individually and informally outside of the advisory committee process.  For 
further discussion of using a mixture of tactics for securing information, see infra Part II.D.
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communications among members of advisory committees take place in the hallways 
before or after the formal meetings or during breaks.166
Informal interaction provides excellent opportunities for regulators to use both 
information-gathering strategies.  They can telephone those whom they believe are more 
disposed to talk – and reward firms that participate through informal trades.  The quid pro 
quos can consist of information from the agency or potentially desirable treatment in 
regulatory action.  Agencies can also informally punish firms that refuse to disclose 
information by reducing access to the agency or subtly slowing the agency’s 
responsiveness on other matters to those.  We develop the virtues of informal interaction 
more fully in the next section.167
To summarize, Table 1 shows the connections between the basic informational 
strategies and the six main tactics.  To create incentives for disclosure, the best tactics are 
(1) mandating disclosure, (2) creating rewards for disclosure (such as by establishing 
recognition programs like EPA’s Performance Track), and (3) engaging in more subtle 
manipulation of interests through informal interaction.  When regulators seek to exploit 
asymmetries, they should (1) issue nonmandatory requests and take advantage of the 
information provided by volunteers, or (2) seek firms more inclined to disclose through 
informal (and hence more hidden) interaction.  Relying on information provided in 
licensing or other approval processes where decisions are conditioned on disclosure will 
166 See Ellen Siegler, Regulatory Negotiations: A Practical Perspective, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. 
INST.) 10,647, 10,648-49 (Oct. 1992) (observing from personal experience that extensive communication 
takes place outside of the public sessions of negotiated rulemaking advisory committees).
167 See infra notes 165-76 and accompanying text.
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generally only help for policy issues that are more tangentially related to the approval 
processes.  Finally, formal interaction, though perhaps serving purposes other than 
information acquisition, generally will not effectively advance either strategy for 
gathering adverse information.  
Table 1.  Potential Contributions of Information Tactics to Strategies
Strategy
Tactic
Exploit 
Asymmetries
Create
Incentives
Contingent Decisions Medium Low
Mandated Disclosure Low High
Rewards and Recognition Low High
Nonmandatory Requests High Low
Formal Interaction Medium Low
Informal Interaction High High
B.  The Virtues of Informality
Throughout the world, proponents of good government favor increased transparency 
(and thus usually formality) in regulatory decision making.168  Informality is often 
viewed as suspect by reviewing courts and others who fear that government’s informal 
168 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE OECD REPORT ON 
REGULATORY REFORM: SYNTHESIS (1997) (noting that “[l]ack of transparency is a key problem” in OECD 
countries).  See also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, STRENGTHENING 
REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY: INSIGHTS FOR THE GATS FROM THE REGULATORY REFORM COUNTRY 
REVIEWS, OECD TD/TC/WP (99)43/FINAL (April 12, 2000) (discussing the importance of transparency in 
domestic regulatory systems).
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interaction with industry will result in regulatory policies that favor industry over the 
broader interests of society.169  Yet from the standpoint of information collection, these 
fears are misplaced:  industry will not hesitate to provide the government with the kind of 
information that would support policies that favor industry, whether the process is formal 
or informal.170  To obtain information needed to advance society’s interests at the 
expense of industry interests, in those cases where this is desirable, regulators must 
exploit or create different interests in disclosure, strategies that are actually made more 
cumbersome by formal, transparent processes.  Whatever the drawbacks to informality, it 
possesses distinct advantages for extracting adverse information.171
169 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2267 (noting that 
interaction taking place in “informal and nontransparent ways” has led to “concerns about inequalities of 
interest group access and resulting agency capture.”); Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American 
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975) (noting that because “bias in agency policies is often 
attributed to informal decisions, courts have imposed requirements that force agencies to adopt formal 
procedures”).
170
  Of course, the concern may less with information than with firms using informality to offer explicit or 
implicit bribes to government officials.  We discuss implicit trades for information in more detail in Part 
IV.D.   
171 See KERWIN, RULEMAKING, supra note 142, at 192 (noting that “informal mechanisms and difficult-to-
observe mechanisms for communicating views to agencies are used a great deal and are thought to be as or 
more effective than traditional means – such as written comment – that figure so prominently in the 
procedural law and academic literature on rulemaking”); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F2d at 401 (“Informal 
contacts may enable to the agency to . . . spur the provision of information which the agency needs.”).
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Informal interaction enables regulators to be more proactive and nimble in their 
efforts to gather information, partly due to the lower costs associated with informality.172
It is very easy to pick up the phone and call a contact in industry.  It is also usually less 
costly to craft and calibrate incentives when proceeding informally.  Simply failing to 
return a phone call or to invite a trade association representative to an important meeting 
are cheap ways to punish an uncooperative firm.  Returning phone calls, sharing 
information about agency initiatives, or involving industry in key meetings are cheap 
ways to reward cooperative firms.173
Informality also preserves the regulator’s discretion and protects the privacy of 
communications, allowing regulators to target discretely those firms that are more likely 
to disclose.  Information disclosure is less visible when it is informal, so that informants 
who break industry’s collective silence can be better protected against retribution.  The 
opaque nature of informal interaction allows regulators to create incentives for disclosure 
without being accused of having created special deals, which they are in fact making, or 
of having treated firms unfairly by punishing them for failing to share information.174
172 See supra notes 142-69 and accompanying text.
173
  These rewards and punishments may seem insignificant, but to firms in heavily regulated industries, the 
loss of reciprocal cooperation can be quite significant.  These players know that even though they may 
make strenuous substantive objections to agency proposals, it is not in their interest to play hardball with 
regulatory staff.  Coglianese, supra note 6.
174
 Making the case for punishing nondisclosure is usually difficult.  After all, if a firm failed to disclose 
information, is that because there was nothing to disclose or because the firm was uncooperative?  See 
supra note 110-111 and accompanying text.  Since the “crime” of nondisclosure or inadequate disclosure 
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Regulators and industry representatives who interact with each other repeatedly will 
tacitly understand the incentives that regulators create informally, but these same 
incentives will often be nearly invisible to others.
The opaque nature of informal interaction helps to preserve deniability.  Though 
deniability can be used to hide actions that are illegal or inconsistent with the public 
interest, it is also extremely helpful for whistleblowers, firms that volunteer information 
adverse to others in their industry, and public-interested regulators who need to make 
deals to gain needed information.  The pressures that work against the revelation of 
adverse information can be significant, so the ability to communicate confidentially 
increases the likelihood that some socially valuable information will be transmitted.  
Deniability is especially important for representatives of trade associations, who often 
negotiate with both the agency and the managers and firms that they represent.175  In 
order to win the favor of regulators, trade association representatives will sometimes 
provide information off the record, such as about industry’s general “bottom line.”  
Individual lobbyists sometimes privately tell regulators that their industry will not resist a 
specific policy provision, even as they maintain a public posture of resistance.  As with 
leaks of government information to the press, those who provide the information to the 
government often need to preserve deniability for what they have disclosed.  
seldom has its corpus delecti (dead body), regulators’ efforts at punishment for nondisclosure will often be 
susceptible to charges of unfairness.  
175
 Cary Coglianese, Unequal Representation: Membership Input and Interest Group  Decisions
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/prg/cary/unequal.htm.
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Much more than with formal interaction, informal interaction allows government to 
derive information from the behavior of firms, not just from what they say.  Regulators 
draw inferences about the intensity of different firms’ interests from the extent of their 
involvement on specific regulatory issues.176  Such intensities are better uncovered by 
informal processes, in which firms choose their own level of participation, than in formal 
processes which – due to their focus on fairness –tend to foster equal levels of 
participation. 
Extensive and active resistance to a regulation suggests that an industry, or the firms 
within it, have information that the regulation will impose high compliance costs.177
Firms will overstate these costs, but reveal their intensity through their observable 
lobbying efforts.178  Moreover, when informal relationships with government are 
ongoing, firms are more constrained in their ability to overstate – they cannot repeatedly 
threaten that they are going to close down in the face of regulatory action without losing 
credibility.
For these reasons, regulators should rely on informal tactics before resorting to formal 
ones.  Even when they are insufficient, informal tactics can inform regulators’ use of 
176 RICHARD L. HALL, PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS 3, 7, 237 (1996) (discussing the role of intensities of 
interests).
177 See Johnston, supra note 12.
178
  Regulators do not need to see the lobbyists’ actual expenditures to draw these inferences, as has 
sometimes been suggested.  Matthew D. Adler, The Positive Political Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis: A 
Comment on Johnston, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 1429, 1442-43 (2002).  Instead, regulators can gauge a firm’s 
relative level of interest by comparing its lobbying on one issue with its lobbying on other issues -- or with 
lobbying by other firms of comparable size on other issues.
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other tactics, such as issuing subpoenas.  To issue effective mandatory information 
requests, regulators need to know what to ask, and informal, off-the-record conversations 
can point the way.  For example, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer took 
advantage of informal tips provided by industry insiders to lay the groundwork for 
several formal investigations of financial markets by his office and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.179
C.  Discerning Truth from a Position of Ignorance
Information collection is ultimately about finding truth.  How do regulators judge 
whether they have obtained accurate information?  As former FDA Commissioner David 
Kessler has commented, “Because we did not understand exactly what we were looking 
for, we did not know how to press the company for more information.  And when the 
company gave us answers, we had no way to challenge them.”180  While this problem can 
never be fully overcome, it can be addressed in two ways.  
179 See, e.g., Abigail Rayner, Ten-Minute Call Sparked Inquiry, The Times, Dec. 10,. 2003, at 33.  The 
charges filed against Putnam Investments for market timing followed a tip-off by an employee at a Putnam 
call-center to Massachusetts’ regulators.  John Hechinger, How One Call Taker Spurred the Putnam 
Mutual-Fund Case, The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 28, 2003, at C1.
180 KESSLER, supra note 31, 182 (2001). This problem is compounded when, as happens on many important 
regulatory issues, regulators actually have before them an abundance of bits of data given to them by 
industry, for they need to know which of these bits are accurate and relevant.  This is why, earlier in this 
article, in defining the problem of collective “silence,” we made a point to acknowledge that we were 
making a simplifying assumption in treating disclosure as a binary choice.  See infra note 41 and 
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The first is to draw upon multiple sources of information.  (Social scientists call this 
triangulation.)181  If different sources and methods generate reasonably consistent 
answers, then regulators can have greater confidence in the accuracy of the 
information.182  If the information proves inconsistent, regulators must consider the 
interests of those providing information and their reputations for credibility.
When regulators routinely seek out multiple sources of information, firms have an 
added incentive to be honest, knowing that others will provide a check on what they 
accompanying text.  Even if this assumption were to be relaxed, the problem we have elucidated in this 
article remains basically the same.  The collective silence problem we have addressed here is not 
necessarily a problem of getting industry to say something at all, but rather of getting them to say 
something accurate when doing so would ordinarily be against their interests.
181
  Alan Bryman, Triangulation, in MICHAEL LEWIS-BECK ET AL., EDS., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL 
SCIENCE RESEARCH METHODS (forthcoming), available at http://www.referenceworld.com/sage/social-
science/triangulation.pdf.
182
 If the information is not consistent, regulators should consider the interests of those providing the 
information and their reputations for credibility.  If some firms provide data showing that a regulation will 
be extremely costly, but other similar firms in the same industry provide data showing that it will not be as 
costly, regulators might appropriately discount the data provided by the first set of firms, as claims of high 
compliance costs are self-serving.  The claims by firms reporting lower compliance costs will be properly 
viewed as more credible, all other things being equal.  On the other hand, if industry reports that 
compliance costs will be high but consumer or environmental activists provide information indicating that 
the costs will be low, then without anything further regulators will be unable to adjudicate between the two 
claims, since the information provided by consumer groups would also be self-serving. 
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say.183  In addition, the more sources the regulator approaches, the more likely one or 
more will squeal.  Not surprisingly, regulators and former regulators have told us that 
they gather information by pursuing many different avenues, seeking information from 
multiple sources.  They vet information gathered from one source with other sources; use 
information obtained through one tactic to bolster and refine other tactics; and sometimes 
bring parties with disparate interests together to test competing claims in informal, 
adversarial meetings.184
Regulators can also improve the reliability of information by fostering closer and 
longer relationships with industry.  While close, ongoing relationships between regulators 
and industry have long been deplored, often characterized pejoratively as “cozy iron 
triangles,”185 they also allow regulators and representatives from industry to learn to 
cooperate with each other and gain a basis for establishing credibility and trust.186  A firm 
183
  This can also serve as a check on any “groupthink” bias that might emerge over time in government’s 
ongoing relationships with industry.
184
 David Kessler’s account of the FDA’s efforts to regulate cigarettes is a good illustration of how an 
agency deploys multiple tactics and tries to triangulate.  KESSLER, supra note 31.  
185 DOUGLAS CATER, POWER IN WASHINGTON (1964).  The more neutral terms are “issue networks” and 
“regulatory cultures.”  Hugh Heclo, Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment, in ANTHONY KING, 
ED., THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (1978); Thomas L Gais et al., Interest Groups, Iron 
Triangles, and Representative Institutions in American National Government, 14 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 161-
185 (1984); Mark A. Peterson, Political Influence in the 1990s: From Iron Triangles to Policy Networks, 
18 J. HEALTH POL., POL. & L. 395 (1993); Meidinger, supra note 146.
186 See Coglianese, supra note 6, at 749-53.  Interestingly, the original work on the evolution of cooperation 
came from an analysis of iterated play of the prisoner’s dilemma, a game that in its original formulation is 
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may wish to distort information given to the regulator in any given round of the 
regulatory game, but if the regulator uncovers a deception it can retaliate against the firm 
(albeit perhaps in subtle ways) in later rounds. For heavily regulated industries, regulators 
are civil servants who tend to remain in their positions for a long time; hence, the shadow 
of the future will be long.187
D.  Implications for Administrative Law
For at least the past half-century, social scientists and legal scholars have viewed 
closeness between regulators and industry as a matter of concern, a problem to overcome 
through the design of administrative law.188  Closeness has implied influence and bias, 
the risk of regulatory capture, and the creation of regulatory policy that systematically 
favors the interests of industry.189  As a result, administrative law has through the years 
really all about the disclosure of information.  See AXELROD, supra note 100; Parson, Zeckhauser & 
Coglianese, supra note 7.
187 See Coglianese, supra note 6, at 753.
188 See, e.g., THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES
(1979); Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 
(1975).
189
 Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Administrative State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
1511, 1565 (1992) (“According to the capture hypothesis, instead of providing meaningful input into 
deliberation about the public interest, industry representatives co-opt governmental regulatory power in 
order to satisfy their private desires.”).
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aimed to make the regulatory process more transparent, with little concern for the 
regulator’s information deficit.190
  Congress has pronounced that it is “the policy of the United States that the public is 
entitled to the fullest practicable information regarding the decisionmaking processes of 
the Federal Government.”191  This general commitment runs throughout administrative 
law.  For example, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) establishes a presumption 
190
 Slater Steels Corp. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1379 (Ct. Intl. Trade 2003) (“Agency 
transparency is a cornerstone of administrative law.”); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and 
the Need for a New Administrative Law, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 125, 147 (2003) (“Administrative 
law has always been grounded upon basic norms. These norms include transparency, participation, and 
fairness.”); Martin Shapiro, Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance, 
8 IND. J. GLOB. L. STUD. 369, 376 (2001) (“[A] fascination with transparency and participation remains 
central to administrative law”); (Cary Coglianese, Administrative Law, in PAUL B. BALTES & NEIL J. 
SMELSER, EDS., 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 85-88 (2001) 
(“Transparent procedures and opportunities for public input give organized interests an ability to represent 
themselves, and their constituencies, in the administrative process.…These procedures may also protect 
against regulatory capture.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 1039 (1997) (noting the judicial thrust toward “changing the procedural rules that govern 
agency decisionmaking [to] force agencies to open their doors -- and their minds – to formerly 
unrepresented points of view, with the result that capture would be eliminated or at least reduced”); Home 
Box Office v. Fed. Commn. Comm., 567 F.2d 9, 57 (1977) (“Secrecy [is inconsistent] with fundamental 
notions of fairness implicit in due process and with the ideal of reasoned decisionmaking on the merits 
which undergirds all of our administrative law.”).
191
 Government in Sunshine Act, Pub. L. 94-40, § 2 (1976) (preamble).
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that government records will be accessible to the public.192  The Government in Sunshine 
Act and the Federal Advisory Committee Act require that critical regulatory meetings be 
announced in advance and made open to the public.193  Regulators are expected to 
document ex parte communications that occur after the publication of a notice of 
proposed rulemaking.194  In addition, regulators must provide reasons for their policies 
and must base their decisions on an administrative record that is available to the public as 
well as to courts and members of Congress.195
These rules aim to prevent abuses and systematic bias, which are genuine concerns.196
Nevertheless, they also hobble the ability of well-intentioned regulators to secure the 
reliable information they need to make better decisions.  Administrative law 
developments that make the regulatory process more transparent dampen the leverage the 
regulator has over industry in the information game.  For example, under the Regulatory 
192
 5 U.S.C. § 552.
193
 5 U.S.C. §552b; 5 U.S.C. App. 2.
194 See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
195
  Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Insur. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).   The 
presumption of judicial review combined with the establishment of executive and legislative oversight 
embeds regulatory policy making within a constitutional system of checks and balances designed to keep 
decision-making from being based on a narrow set of interests or factions.  Cass Sunstein, Factions, Self-
Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VIRG. L. REV. 271 (1986); Seidenfeld, supra note 186.
196
  Mock, supra note 39, at 1092 (“Transparency about government operations and the finances of 
government officials is a primary means of deterring corruption and of uncovering it when it occurs.”); see 
also id. at 1094 (“[T]ransparency has value in preventing and revealing rent-seeking”); id. at 1100 
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Flexibility Act, agencies must publish information twice a year about all the regulations it 
has in development,197 and FOIA obligates agencies to disclose internal agency 
documents whenever industry requests them.198  These laws weaken the regulator’s 
position vis-à-vis industry in the information game, even though they do serve important 
values in a democracy.  In the absence of these laws, regulators could be more selective 
about sharing such information, providing it more readily to those who in return provide 
the agency with information it needs.199
Transparency can also undercut the regulator’s ability to elicit information from firms 
that might fear retribution.  Regulators do not want to risk exposing their best sources of 
information within industry, any more than those who work for national security and 
intelligence agencies want to risk exposing their sources.  A bit of opacity protects the 
privacy of sources, and may allow firms or their representatives to be more forthcoming 
and honest about sharing adverse information.
(“[T]ransparency is coming to be recognized as essential to good governance and to establishment of the 
rule of law within ordered societies.”).
197
  5 U.S.C. §§601-612 (1994 and Supp. III 1997).
198
  5 U.S.C. §552.
199
 Of course, even with these laws, agencies still may be able to trade on the slippage between the law on 
the books and the law in action.  They may, for example, be able to trade on more fine-grained information 
about the agency that cannot be obtained in any way other than through information trades.  Moreover, just 
as mandatory disclosure is a limited tool for regulators, the mandatory disclosure requirements imposed 
upon agencies may be limited for outside groups that really want to know what is going on within the 
agency.  This is why large and sophisticated industry players still acknowledge an advantage to becoming 
“joined at the hip” with the regulatory agency.  See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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Requiring complete transparency about virtually every conversation in government, 
though perhaps now technologically possible, would make regulators’ jobs much more 
difficult.  What is needed is neither total transparency nor total opacity, but rather a mix 
that mitigates the risk of regulatory bias, whether from cognitive bias or outright 
corruption, and preserves some room for regulators to interact privately with industry in 
order to pry open industry’s collective silence.
Despite administrative law’s overall trend toward transparency, a few procedural 
features still leave some room for regulators to play the information game.  For example, 
agency procedures, as well as the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in Home Box Office, do 
not prohibit ex parte communications altogether, nor do they generally require agency 
staff members to document all of their ex parte communications.200  Rather, they only 
require documentation of those communications taking place after the agency issues a 
proposed rule.201  Not surprisingly, interest groups have come to engage in extensive 
informal communication with regulators before any proposed rules are announced.202
Even FOIA preserves some protection for the privacy of business information by
exempting certain types of records from required disclosure, including national security 
documents, personnel records, and trade secrets or other confidential business 
information.203  Significantly, the D.C. Circuit, concerned with the impact of disclosure
on future government efforts to secure information, has held that FOIA requires 
200 See supra notes 152-54.
201 Id.
202 KERWIN, supra note 142, at 188.
203
  5 U.S.C. §552(b).
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additional protection for confidential business information that industry voluntarily 
provides to government.204  Congress has also recently added new protections against 
disclosure under FOIA for confidential information provided voluntarily by industry on 
“critical infrastructure,” such as telecommunications, energy, financial, and transportation 
systems.205  These measures strike a balance between openness and government’s need to 
protect industry’s confidential exchange of information with government regulators.206
Against administrative law’s overall march toward greater transparency, these 
measures stand out in their recognition of how government regulators must acquire 
information from industry.  While transparency has important virtues, some level of 
informality and confidentiality is also needed if government is to preserve its ability to 
play the information game effectively.  
204
 Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 975 F. 2d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(en banc) (finding that disclosure under FOIA of voluntarily disclosed business information “would 
frustrate Congress’s purpose of ‘encouraging cooperation with the Government by persons having 
information useful to officials’”) (quoting National Parks and Conservation Association v. Morton, 498 F. 
2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
205
 Critical Infrastructure Act of 2001, § 5(a)(1)(A); Homeland Security Act of 2002, § 724.
206
 In addition, there lies lurking behind the Supreme Court litigation involving Vice President Cheney’s 
energy task force a policy dispute over the balance between transparency and governmental effectiveness.  
Richard B. Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, United States Supreme Court, No. 
03-475.  In response to the Vice President’s argument that discovery of executive branch communications 
would inhibit candid and effective advice to the President, amici favoring disclosure have argued that 
“representative democracy can succeed only if information about government is broadly available” and that 
“secrecy is antithetical to representative government.”  Brief Amicus Curiae American Library Association, 
Cheney v. U.S. District Court, No. 03-475 (March 11, 2004).
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Despite noting this, we recognize that informal relationships between regulators and 
industry may well bring problems, and that transparency offers important virtues.  
Indeed, our analysis of the information game leads us to call attention to an important but 
frequently overlooked tradeoff facing administrative law.  The challenge is to minimize 
the sum of two competing types of errors: (1) those associated with agency bias and 
nefarious conduct, and (2) those associated with regulators’ failure to secure necessary 
information.  Recognizing the tradeoff involved in addressing these competing errors is 
an important step.  It opens up a major avenue for future research; ultimately it should 
make it easier to find solutions that minimize the sum of the two error types.207  Such 
solutions may vary across agencies and regulatory problems, but they will involve 
striking some balance between opacity and transparency.
One kind of balance could be struck by keeping parts of the regulatory process 
confidential, but only for limited periods.  After the period of confidentiality had lapsed 
(say, after three to five years), agencies would need to release records of their 
communications with outsiders.  Assurance of confidentiality might give sufficient cover 
to facilitate information exchange, but general awareness of a subsequent release could 
counteract temptations to abuse secrecy.
207
 Scholars have recognized the existence of risk-risk tradeoffs in health and safety regulation.  See, e.g., 
JOHN D. GRAHAM AND JONATHAN BAERT WIENER, RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING 
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995).  The basic structure of the tradeoff in the information game is the 
same, only it is between the risk of bias and the risk of ignorance.
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Another option is to keep parts of the regulatory process opaque but impose penalties 
for demonstrably objectionable conduct.208  Given that opacity can be expected to lead to 
informal trading in information, greater care should be taken to avoid coercion or corrupt 
actions.  Thus, auditing for such abuses by senior managers, agency inspector generals, or 
the General Accounting Office should be in place, along with adequate penalties.
A final approach is to preserve pockets of opacity in a process that demands reasoned 
explanations, based on an open agency record, for each new regulation.  Agency officials 
can talk secretly with industry to ferret out adverse information; however, information 
critical to any new regulation still needs to form part of the agency’s public justification.  
As a result, any leads or information obtained through opaque channels subsequently 
should be corroborated through more open means, including the possibility of mandated 
disclosure.  Such an approach fits well with the current presumption of the availability of 
judicial review.  As a check on abuse, courts, legislators, and other overseers demand 
reasoned explanations of agencies’ regulatory decisions.209
The tradeoff between protecting against bias and ensuring regulators obtain necessary 
information means that transparency should not become transcendent in administrative 
208 Cf. supra note 83 and accompanying text.
209
  In Sierra Club v. Costle, Judge Patricia Wald offered a similar argument for the court’s decision to 
permit agencies to engage in ex parte communications during informal rulemaking.  657 F.2d at 400-10.  
After explaining some of the virtues and vices of informal contacts in rulemaking, she suggested that the 
vices would be counteracted by the requirement that the “EPA must justify its rulemaking solely on the 
basis of the record it compiles and makes public.”  Id.
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law.  Rather, the goal for administrative law lies in balancing between transparency and 
opacity along the lines of one or more of the alternatives we have outlined.
Conclusion
Regulators must rely on industry for significant amounts of information they need to 
craft effective and efficient regulatory policies.  However, it is often not in a firm’s or an 
industry’s interest to provide that information.  By working closely and informally with 
industry, regulators can identify specific firms or employees whose interests in disclosure 
might differ from those of their competitors.  Regulators can also try to create incentives 
– rewards and punishments – that might lead some firms to break with the industry’s 
collective silence.  Both strategies are easier to pursue when regulators can interact 
informally with industry in ways that are not transparent to others, including the overall 
public.  
Much attention has been given in recent years to the need for improving the analytical 
and scientific basis of regulatory policy making.  Congress and the executive branch have 
required regulatory agencies to engage in more careful policy analysis before issuing new 
rules.  While these efforts have merit, the value of regulatory analysis ultimately depends 
on the quality and reliability of the information on which it is based.  The challenge of 
securing essential information for regulators’ decisions is a fundamental one for anyone 
interested in improving the quality of regulatory decision making.  
Meeting this challenge will require resisting any temptation toward enforced total 
transparency.  Transparency combats the dangers of cozy relationships between 
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regulators and industry, to be sure, but it also detracts from regulators’ abilities to exploit 
asymmetries of interest across firms and to engage in informal interactions.  The 
challenge for administrative law is therefore to find an optimal level of visibility, 
balancing the values served by transparency against regulators’ need to employ behind-
the-scenes measures to obtain information from those they regulate.  Striking the right 
balance will require recognizing that sometimes government best advances the public 
interest by giving industry rewards in exchange for information or engaging in informal, 
off-the-record conversations, even though this behavior may appear indistinguishable 
from the kind of corruption or regulatory capture that administrative law has long sought 
to prevent.  Ensuring that regulators can secure accurate information therefore calls for 
sophisticated regulatory practices that allow regulators to extract information yet seek to 
counteract the kind of regulatory capture that has long been properly deplored.  
